Tải bản đầy đủ - 0 (trang)
22 - Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe.pdf

22 - Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe.pdf

Tải bản đầy đủ - 0trang

Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe 415

3 TABLE 22.1 3

The European Population Explosion, 1700–1900

The data in this table reflect historical boundaries at the date shown and therefore are not perfectly comparable. For example, the population of AlsaceLorraine is included in France in 1800 and in Germany in 1900.



State

France

European Russia

Germany

Italy

Austria-Hungary

United Kingdom

Spain

Portugal

Sweden

Netherlands

Denmark

Switzerland

Belgium

Ottoman Empire

in Europe



1700 Population

(in millions)



1800 Population

(in millions)



Growth,

1700–1800

(in percent)



17.3

17.0

13.5

13.0

11.0

8.9

7.5

2.0

2.0

1.9

1.3

1.2



26.9

29.0

18.5

18.1

15.0

16.2

10.5

2.8

2.3

2.1

1.9

1.7



55.5

70.6

37.0

39.2

36.4

82.0

40.0

40.0

15.0

10.5

46.2

41.7



a



a



39.0

106.2

56.4

33.4

25.9

41.5

18.1

5.4

5.1

5.1

2.6

3.3

6.7



79.7



4.8



6.4



11.5



1900 Population

(in millions)



Growth,

1800–1900

(in percent)

45.0

266.2

204.9

84.5

72.7

156.2

72.4

92.9

121.7

142.9

36.8

94.1



Source: Calculated from data in Jack Barbuscio and Richard M. Dunn, European Political Facts, 1648–1789 (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 335–53; Chris Cook

and John Paxton, European Political Facts, 1848-1918 (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 213–32; A. Goodwin, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 8:714–15; B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 19–24.

a. Part of the Austrian Empire. No separate data available.



nutrition, epidemic disease, primitive medical care, warfare, and repressive government, had limited that

growth. Great Britain offers a vivid illustration. After

William the Conqueror won control of England in

1066, he ordered a survey of his new realm; the resultant Domesday Survey (1086) determined that England

had a population of 3.5 million. A good estimate of

England in 1750 is a population of 6.5 million, which

meant an increase of three million people in seven hundred years, an average growth rate of less than 1 percent per decade.

In contrast to that history of slow population

growth, what happened during the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century must be called a population explosion. A continent inhabited by perhaps 110

million people in 1700 became a continent of 423 million people in 1900. This near quadrupling of Europe

meant a growth rate of nearly 10 percent per decade,

compared with the historic pattern of less than 1 percent. Britain, where the European population explosion

began, provides the best illustration of this growth. Beginning in 1750, the British isles experienced three consecutive decades of 6 percent population growth,

followed by stunning decennial increases of 9 percent,



11 percent, 14 percent, and 18 percent. The astonishing population boom meant that a country that had

grown by three million people over seven hundred

years then grew by eleven million people in one hundred years.

The British population explosion continued into

the nineteenth century and became a widespread (although not universal) European phenomenon (see table

22.1). During the eighteenth century, population

growth in most of the major states of Europe was approximately 35 percent to 40 percent—36 percent in

the Austrian Empire, 37 percent across the Germanic

states of central Europe, 39 percent in the Italian states,

and 40 percent in Spain. France, the most populous and

most powerful state of western Europe, experienced a

slightly faster rate of growth (55 percent) but did not

approach the remarkable 82 percent growth in Britain.

In the nineteenth century, the rate of growth in Austria,

Italy, and Spain increased to 70–85 percent, but the

British rate of growth had soared to more than 150 percent, causing the population density to surpass one

hundred inhabitants per square mile in large portions of

Europe (see map 22.1). Only Germany and Russia—

where population growth was more than 200 percent—



416 Chapter 22

NORWAY



SWEDEN



Sea



1820



ti



c



North

Sea



Bal



DENMARK



RUSSIA

BRITAIN



NETH.

Rh



in e



GERMAN

CONFEDERATION



R.



S e in e R

.



D anu be



R.

Loire



Atlantic

Ocean



AUSTRIAN

EMPIRE



SWITZ.



FRANCE



R.



Po R.



POR.



Corsica



R.

ds



Ebr

o



Sardinia



an



SPAIN



ITALY



B a le

0



I

aric



sl



Sicily

200



0



400



600 Kilometers



200



Mediterranean

Sea



400 Miles



Crete



Inhabitants per square mile

20 – 50



< 20



50 – 100



NORWAY



SWEDEN



Sea



1900



100 +



ti



c



North

Sea



Bal



DENMARK



RUSSIA

BRITAIN



NETH.

Rh



in e



R.



BELG.



GERMANY



S e in e R

.



D anu be



R.

Loire



Atlantic

Ocean



SWITZ.



FRANCE



R.



Po R.



POR.



Corsica



R.

nds



Ebr

o



ITALY



Sardinia



la



SPAIN



AUSTRIAN

EMPIRE



B a le

0

0



I

aric



s



Sicily

200



400



200



600 Kilometers

400 Miles



Mediterranean

Sea



Crete



MAP 22.1

— The Density of Population in Europe, 1820–1900 —



Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe 417

kept up with Britain. France, which pioneered modern

birth control practices, did not experience such a dramatic population explosion, and the nineteenth-century

growth rate there (45 percent) was lower than that of

the eighteenth century (55 percent).

The beginning of this population explosion so

shocked one English economist, the Reverend Thomas

Malthus, that he wrote the most famous book about

population ever published, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), warning about the dangers of this trend.

Malthus argued that unchecked population growth

tended to increase at a geometric rate (one, two, four,

eight, sixteen, thirty-two), while the means of subsistence to support those people increased only at an

arithmetic rate (one, two, three, four, five, six). The

contrast between these two rates, known as the

Malthusian principle, prompted the pessimistic conclusion that, without some preventive restraints on population increase, the future of humankind would be a story

of catastrophic checks on population.



The European death rate, especially the infant mortality rate, had remained frightfully high during the

eighteenth century, and in many years the death rate

surpassed the birthrate. Studies of regions of Europe

that had higher birthrates than Britain did—such as

Lombardy in northern Italy—have shown that great increases in the number of births did not necessarily produce a significant population increase. If the twin

guardians of the biological old regime, diet and disease,

were not beaten, the death rate simply consumed the

higher birthrate. The vital revolution of the late eighteenth century owed more to the improvement of diet

than to the conquest of disease: The benefits of the

Columbian exchange, such as the potato and the agricultural revolution meant that Europe could feed a

larger population. The great medical advances of the

vital revolution mostly came in the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries, although the slow conquest of

smallpox had begun with Mary Wortley Montagu and

Edward Jenner in the eighteenth century.



The Vital Revolution



The Urbanization of Europe



The conquest of the biological old regime, through the

improvement of diet and the conquering of disease,

amounts to a great vital revolution. The vital revolution

that began in the late eighteenth century and extended

through the twentieth century is arguably the most important revolution in modern history, even when compared with famous political and economic revolutions.

Demographers measure the vital revolution with a variety of statistics, but the most important are straightforward: the birthrate and the death rate. The population

of Europe had grown very slowly for centuries for the

simple reason that the birthrate and the death rate remained similar. If one studies the birth and death data

for early eighteenth-century Britain, the balance of the

biological old regime becomes clear. In 1720, the birthrate per ten thousand people (314) and the death rate

(311) were almost identical. Then in 1730, the death

rate (349) exceeded the birthrate (339) and that pattern

continued in 1740. Thus, for the first generation of the

century, the biological old regime kept a virtually even

balance between births and deaths. Beginning in 1750,

however, British birthrates remained steady at a high

level (between 366 and 377 per ten thousand) for

decades, while the death rate plummeted, hitting 300

in 1770, then falling to 211 by 1820. The huge gap between 366 births and 211 deaths per ten thousand population is the demographer’s measure of the vital

revolution, the source of the population explosion, and

the pattern that frightened Malthus.



The vital revolution led to the urbanization of European civilization. For more than two thousand years,

the greatest centers of European civilization—from ancient Athens and Rome through the Italian city-states

of the Renaissance to London and Paris in the Old

Regime—had been its cities. By 1750 European cities

had been growing in size and numbers for centuries.

But the eighteenth century was not yet an urban society; in every country, the majority of the population

lived on farms and in small villages.

The British census of 1850 found that more than

50 percent of the population lived in towns and cities,

making Britain the first predominantly urban society in

history. The early nineteenth century was consequently

a period of remarkable urban growth. Between 1750

and 1800, nineteen towns in Europe doubled in size,

and fifteen of them were located in Britain. No town in

France, none in the Italian states, nor any in Russia

grew so rapidly, but in northern England—from Lancashire in the west, across the midlands to Yorkshire in

the east—seven towns doubled in size. And the impact

of the population explosion was just beginning. During

the next half-century, 1800–50, seven British cities (five

of them in northern England) tripled in size, some

nearly quintupling.

British cities were not huge by twenty-first century

standards, but they were astonishing by contemporary

standards because the population explosion had not yet

transformed the continent. The port of Liverpool, a



418 Chapter 22

3 TABLE 22.2 3

The Major Cities of Europe, 1800–1900

British cities are highlighted in bold-faced type. Note the importance of British cities in the data for 1850, a date often chosen as the point at which Britain

had become a predominantly industrial society.

Europe in 1800



Europe in 1850



Europe in 1900



City



Population



City



Population



City



Population



London



1,117,000



London



2,685,000



London



6,586,000



Paris



547,000



Paris



1,053,000



Paris



2,714,000



Naples



427,000



St. Petersburg



489,000



Berlin



1,889,000



Moscow



250,000



Naples



449,000



Vienna



1,675,000



Vienna



247,000



Vienna



444,000



St. Petersburg



1,267,000



St. Petersburg



220,000



Berlin



419,000



Moscow



989,000



Amsterdam



201,000



Liverpool



376,000



Hamburg



931,000



Lisbon



180,000



Moscow



365,000



Budapest



732,000



Berlin



172,000



Glasgow



357,000



Liverpool



704,000



Dublin



165,000



Manchester



303,000



Manchester



645,000



Rome



163,000



Madrid



281,000



Warsaw



638,000



Madrid



160,000



Dublin



272,000



Brussels



599,000



Palermo



139,000



Brussels



251,000



Naples



564,000



Milan



135,000



Milan



242,000



Madrid



540,000



Venice



134,000



Lisbon



240,000



Barcelona



533,000



Hamburg



130,000



Birmingham



233,000



Amsterdam



511,000



Barcelona



115,000



Amsterdam



224,000



Munich



500,000



Edinburgh



202,000



Milan



493,000



Source: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970 (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 76–78; Chris Cook and John Paxton, European Political Facts,

1848–1918 (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 213–32.



town that had become prosperous during the slave

trade, grew so fast in the early nineteenth century that

it surpassed such capital cities as Moscow and Madrid

in size (see table 22.2). In 1850 the British isles contained seven cities larger than Rome, the historic center

of Europe. Nearly a quarter of the British population

lived in metropolitan areas of 100,000 or more, while

only 4.6 percent of France and 2.3 percent of Spain

lived in such urban regions. The great Swiss cities of

Geneva (31,000) and Zürich (17,000) were suddenly

smaller than British towns such as Bradford (104,000).

In 1800, two of the ten largest cities in Europe (London

and Dublin) were in the United Kingdom; by 1850,

four of the ten largest (London, Liverpool, Glasgow,

and Manchester) were in the U.K.

When the effects of the population explosion

reached continental Europe, so did urbanization. Just as

Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, and Sheffield had exploded from regional towns into major urban centers,



new cities grew in Europe. Essen, in the Ruhr valley of

western Germany, changed from a small town of 4,000

people in 1800 into a sprawling city of 295,000 at the

start of the twentieth century. The transformation of

L

/ odz (Poland) was even more dramatic: A village of

200 people in 1800 became a city of 315,000 in 1900.

By 1900 only three of the largest cities in Europe were

in Britain.



Q



The Agricultural Revolution

The first explanation of the vital revolution was an improved food supply. Although the nineteenth century

still experienced famines in some regions (especially

Russia) and occasional disasters such as the potato

famine of the 1840s, the pattern of regular subsistence

crises that characterized early modern history ended by



Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe 419

the middle of the nineteenth century. The average European diet was poor by twenty-first century standards,

but it had significantly improved since the eighteenth

century, producing better general health, greater resistance to disease, and higher rates of healthy reproduction.

The improved food supply is best seen in late eighteenth-century Britain, where the population explosion

began. Despite restrictive tariffs on grain imports

known as the Corn Laws, Britain imported an increasing amount of food after 1780, and this provided partial

support for a larger population. British grain imports

stood at 200,000 tons in 1780, rising to 3.7 million tons

in 1800, and then 7.5 million tons in 1840. At the same

time, the improvements in British internal transportation—canals, toll roads, and railroads—reduced food

prices in urban areas. Food shipment also improved as

new technology allowed the preservation of food for

transportation, beginning with the adoption of a sterile

canning process that a Parisian chef, Franỗois Appert,

had invented for Napoleons armies in 1804.

The greatest source of an improved food supply in

Britain, however, was an increase in British harvests so

significant that historians have called it an agricultural

revolution. The agricultural revolution involved both

extensive use of land (more acres planted) and intensive

use of the land (higher yields per acre). The stimulus to

both developments was simple: Grain prices rose with

the population, previous bad harvests had left few grain

reserves, and a generation of war with France sometimes interrupted the importation of grain (which fell

from 4.6 million tons to 2.9 million tons in the years

following 1810).

Extensive use of the soil provides obvious possibilities. Land could be reclaimed by draining marshes and

wetlands, such as the fens of eastern England or the

marshes of central Italy. In other regions of Europe, especially Scandinavia and eastern Europe, sparsely populated woodlands and wildernesses could be cleared and

planted. Wherever the science of agronomy established

modern crop rotation, the tradition of leaving fields lie

fallow every third year could be abandoned. This alone

produced a 10 percent increase in arable land in some

regions.

The most impressive side of the agricultural revolution—more intensive use of the land—achieved an unprecedented rise in European productivity. Scientific

farming, such as improved understanding of fertilizers,

significantly improved the harvest per acre. The beginnings of modern farm mechanization—from Jethro

Tull’s development of seed drills to replace the manual

broadcasting of seeds to Andrew Meikle’s invention of



the threshing machine in 1784—produced more efficient harvests. Such developments increased the ratio

of grain harvested to grain sown. In Britain, the wheat

harvest went from a yield of 7-to-1 to a ratio of 10.6 to

1; at that rate, the British harvest was nearly twice as

productive per acre as the rest of Europe and three

times as successful as farming in eastern Europe.

New crops were also an important part of the agricultural revolution. The introduction of winter crops in

some regions, the continuing arrival of new American

crops from the Columbian exchange, and the steady

acceptance of root crops (such as the potato and the

sugar beet) greatly changed European diets. The potato

grew in more northerly climates and poorer soils than

most grains; it had a three-to-four-month cycle to harvest, compared with ten months for many grains; and a

single crop yielded twice as much nutrition per acre as

grains did. Consequently, by the early 1840s, one-third

of the population of England and one-half of Scotland

lived on the potato. Even higher rates of potato consumption were found in Ireland and parts of Germany.



The Controversy over Enclosure

Clearing forests or swamps and harvesting more crops

per acre were not the only changes by which the agricultural revolution fed the growing population of the

British isles. The greatest source of new acreage being

farmed resulted from a controversial political decision

known as enclosure. This term simply means the enclosing of farm land within fences. The laws of enclosure, however, had more profound results than that

description suggests, leading some historians to argue

that it was a necessary condition for industrialization.

By ancient tradition, most villages in Britain reserved a

portion of local land called the commons for the use

of all residents. No one could plant crops on the commons, but anyone could graze animals, forage for food

(such as berries or acorns), and gather firewood there.

Enclosure of the commons within fences meant that

the land could be plowed to increase the national

grain production, but the traditional rights of citizens

ended, forcing many of them off the land. Enclosure

in a larger sense ended the open field system of agriculture, in which the land was divided into numerous

small strips. In 1700, 50 percent of English farmland,

and most continental farmland, was in open field

strips. By 1850 virtually all of rural Britain was enclosed.

Each enclosure required an act of Parliament,

and four thousand such acts of enclosure were voted



420 Chapter 22

between 1750 and 1850, although a General Enclosure

Act of 1801 served as a model for most others. By these

acts, the commons lands were sold in some villages and

distributed among the landowners in others. This led to

the consolidation of individual strips into single farms

and the failure of small farms where the owners had depended upon the commons. The resulting farms were

larger than the sum of the strips because they incorporated the paths that had separated the strips, and they

became larger yet as uncompetitive small farms were

absorbed. By the early nineteenth century, two-thirds

of British farmland was in large estates. Enclosure raised

agricultural production as well as controversy. The benefits were larger than simply that more land was put under the plow and therefore more food was produced.

Enclosure of the commons meant the segregation of

herds of livestock, reducing disease transmission and

permitting selective breeding. The breeding experiments conducted with sheep by Robert Bakewell, for

example, saw the average weight of sheep brought to

market rise from twenty-eight pounds in 1710 to eighty

pounds in 1795. Larger farms encouraged crop rotation

because the entire acreage did not have to be planted in

the same subsistence grain for the farm family. Consolidation of the open field strips meant that farm equipment did not have to be moved great distances.

Enclosure provoked opposition because of the human effects on the rural population. Marginal farmers

suffered worst. Without strips of common farmland,

many families could not survive by agriculture. Others

faced failure because they had depended upon the commons to graze a pig or a few geese. As one angry poet

put it, “The law locks up the man or woman who steals

the goose from off the Common; But leaves the greater

villain loose who steals the common from the goose.”

Historians have debated the amount of suffering caused

by enclosure, and they have generally agreed that it is a

question of long-term gains for most of society versus

short-term suffering for much of society.



Q



Handcraft, Cottage Industry,

and the Steam Engine

The agricultural revolution, the vital revolution, and the

population explosion of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe were all important factors in

making possible a dramatic transformation of the European economy known as industrialization, in which

manufactured goods began to replace agriculture as the

dominant sector of the economy. Large-scale factory



production began to replace handcraft manufacture;

machinery and inanimate power sources began to replace human labor. Such large-scale industrialization

did not happen suddenly or universally—factories, traditional production, and agriculture coexisted within a

country, and usually within a region. Nonetheless, industrialization was such a dramatic change that contemporaries and historians (especially in Britain) have

sometimes called it the industrial revolution.

The pressure of growing population demanded

(and rewarded) great increases in the production of essential goods, such as the woolen and cotton textiles

needed for clothing. Such goods had long been made

by traditional handwork methods of spinning thread

and weaving cloth. This handwork production of textiles had spawned a form of manufacturing known as

cottage industry, in which entrepreneurial middlemen

engaged people to produce textiles in their homes

(hence “cottage industry”), provided them with raw materials, paid them for finished work, then transported

the goods to town for sale. This form of employment in

home spinning and weaving lasted throughout the

nineteenth century in some regions, but beginning in

the mid-eighteenth century, technological innovations

replaced human skills and power with machines. Industrialization was the broad process by which machines,

operated by hundreds of people in urban factories, replaced the production of handcraft workers in small

shops and cottages.

The age of industrialization was opened by a single

new technology—the steam engine, which provided

the power source for the innovations that followed.

The principle of steam power was not new. It had been

known in the ancient world and had long been the subject of study and experimentation. No single person invented the steam engine, although popular culture in

English-speaking countries credits James Watt, while

the French credit Denis Papin. In reality, the steam engine was the culmination of the work of many people.

The first effective machines were developed in the

1770s by Watt, a maker of precision instruments for

scientists at the University of Glasgow.

The initial use of the steam engine was in mining.

Steam-powered pumps such as the Newcomen Engine

could remove water from mine shafts that passed below

the water table. This permitted much deeper mining,

which in turn facilitated vastly greater coal extraction;

the coal then could be burned to operate more steam

engines. As coal became more plentiful and less expensive, and as steam engine technology proved successful,

the engine found other applications. Steam-powered

bellows at forges changed metallurgy, producing more



Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe 421

3 TABLE 22.3 3

European Coal Production, 1820–50

The data in this table are national outputs of coal in millions of tons.

Country



1820



Austria



.1



.2



.5



.9



a



2.3



3.9



5.8



Britain



17.7



22.8



34.2



50.2



France



1.1



1.8



3.0



4.4



German states



1.3



1.8



3.9



6.9



Belgium



1830



1840



1850



Source: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970

(London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 360–61.

a. Belgium was not independent in 1820.



Illustration 22.1

— A Coal Mine during Early Industrialization. Coal was the

primary new power source of industrialization. Pumps driven by

steam engines, such as the Newcomen Engine, made it possible

to tunnel below the water table. Note the use of child and female

labor in much of this mine to cart coal in narrow spaces: It was

usually cheaper to use children than pit-ponies.



and finer steel. Steam-powered mills for grinding grains

or sugar freed millers from dependence upon rivers. Experiments applied steam power to transportation, including the first steam automobile (1769), steamboat

(1783), and railroad locomotive (1804). The locomotive

was the perfect symbol of the steam revolution because

it was merely a giant steam engine with wheels attached.



The Age of Iron and Coal

Industrialization quickly came to depend upon plentiful

resources of iron, from which the machinery of steam

technology was made, and coal, with which it was

powered. Both iron and coal had been mined in Europe

for centuries, but the scale of this mining was small.

The total European output of pig iron in 1788 was approximately 200,000 metric tons, of which the British

mined 69,000 tons. Most countries produced so little

iron that they kept no national records of it. Coal mining was a similarly small-scale industry.

Great Britain had the good fortune to possess exceptionally rich deposits of both natural resources. When

the steam engine permitted—then demanded—greater

coal mining, Britain exploited those resources (see illus-



tration 22.1) to become the world’s first industrial power

and to establish an enormous lead in industrial might

(see table 22.3). During the French Revolution and the

Napoleonic Wars, the British output of pig iron tripled to

248 metric tons; with peace, the output tripled again by

the early 1830s. In 1850 Britain smelted 2.3 million metric tons of iron, more than one-half of the total supply of

iron in the world (see illustration 22.2). British coal mining similarly overwhelmed the rest of the world. In 1820

the Austrian Empire mined 100,000 tons of coal and the

German states slightly more than 1 million tons; Britain

mined 17.7 million tons. Twenty years later, Austria and

the German states had tripled their output but that was

barely one-tenth of Britain’s 34.2 million tons of coal. By

midcentury, Britain mined more than two-thirds of the

world’s coal. Consequently, the British also generated

more steam power than all of continental Europe combined. The British dominance in coal, iron, and steam

production built an industrial leadership so great that

Britons naturally spoke of their “industrial revolution”

(see map 22.2).



The Machine Age and the Textile Factory

The availability of inexpensive steam power and iron

for machinery led to an age of remarkable inventiveness. In the century between 1660 and 1760, the British

government had registered an average of six new

patents per year; applications of steam technology

drove that average to more than two hundred patents

per year in the 1770s, more than five hundred per year

in the 1790s, and nearly five thousand per year by the

1840s. The British inventions of the early industrial age



422 Chapter 22

Illustration 22.2

— The Coalbrookdale Ironworks at

Night. Nothing better symbolized the

powerful changes of early industrialization than a large ironworks with its great

coke furnaces stoked. Such ironworks

were typically located on a country river,

where wood, coal, and water were plentiful. This painting depicts the most important early ironworks, Abraham

Darby’s works in central

England.



were not the result of excellent technical schools; continental schools such as the Schemnitz Academy in

Hungary or the École des Ponts et Chaussées (the first

engineering school) in France were far superior. Most

British inventions were the inspiration of tinkerers and

artisans. One of the most important inventors of the

early industrial age, Richard Arkwright, was a semiliterate barber with an exceptional mechanical aptitude.

The earliest beneficiary of the new technology was

the textile industry. Woolen goods had been a basic

British export for centuries; in the early eighteenth century woolens accounted for 25 percent to 33 percent of

export revenue. Cotton goods were a newer export,

produced from raw cotton imported from Britain’s

American colonies. In 1700 textile manufacturing had

not changed much from medieval industry. Fibers were

spun into thread by hand, perhaps with a spinning

wheel, perhaps with simpler tools such as the distaff.

The threads were then woven into cloth on handlooms.

Spinning was usually done by women (hence the terms

spinster or distaff side); weaving, by men. The entire handcraft process fitted comfortably into a rural cottage.

The new technology of the steam age soon threatened cottage industry. Machines first changed the spinning of thread: James Hargreaves’s spinning jenny

allowed one person to spin thread onto multiple spindles, producing ten times as much thread—soon one

hundred times as much thread—as a good manual spinner. Arkwright’s water frame mechanized the spinning

of threads to produce stronger thread with less labor.

The spinning mule of 1779 combined the spinning

jenny, the water frame, and the steam engine to produce forty-eight spindles of high-quality thread



simultaneously. Looms were also mechanized: The mechanical improvement of John Kay’s flying shuttle loom

allowed one person to do the work of two, and Edmund Cartwright patented the first steam-powered

loom in 1785.

The consequence of this new technology was the

textile factory. There, the steam engine could be linked

to the spinning mule, to the power loom, or to banks of

dozens of each. All goods, from raw cotton to coal,

could be delivered to a single, convenient site, chosen

for inexpensive transportation costs such as proximity

to mines, location on a river, or nearness to a great harbor. Instead of having the looms of cottage industry

scattered around the countryside, they were now

grouped together in a single building or factory complex, where an overseer could control the pace and

quality of work. Steam-powered textile machinery produced high-quality cloth in vast quantities.

The first steam loom factory opened at Manchester,

in northern England, in 1806. By 1813 there were 2,400

power looms operating in Britain, concentrated in Lancashire, the Midlands, and Yorkshire. A decade later,

there were more than 10,000 textile factories using

power looms in Britain; at midcentury, 250,000. The resultant change in the scale of textile manufacturing was

even greater than those numbers suggest. Whereas a

master weaver with thirty years of experience could produce two bolts of cotton cloth a week on a handloom, a

fifteen-year-old boy at a power loom could produce

seven bolts. Britain dominated global commerce in textiles, especially in the British Empire and Latin America,

and British merchants began to dream of the day they

could sell a shirt to everyone in China.



Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe 423



0



50



0



100



150 Kilometer



50



100 Miles



North

Sea



Glasgow



SCOTLAND



Cotton and woolen textiles

Machinery

Iron

Liverpool



Bradford

Leeds



Sheffield



Manchester



Iron

Hardware

Birmingham



Iron

Machinery

Pottery



Iron



London



Bristol



Machinery

Consumer goods

Tin and

copper mining



Exposed coalfields



—



Cities with over 100,000

people are labeled.

Towns with over 20,000

people are shown:

50,000



Industrial areas



400,000



Principal railroads



2,400,000



MAP 22.2

The Industrial Revolution in Britain —



The woolen industry, which had older traditions,

resisted the innovations that transformed the cotton industry and mechanized more slowly. Most wool remained handloomed in 1840. Cotton, however, was a

new industry without such resistance to change. It even

attracted innovation, such as patents to make cotton

velvet, to create ribbed cloth for stockings, or to print

patterns on cotton cloth. Consequently, cottons surpassed woolens as Britain’s foremost export in 1803; by

1830 cotton—a plant not native to the British isles—

accounted for more than 50 percent of Britain’s foreign

trade income and more than half of the world’s cotton

cloth came from Britain.



The Railroad Age

The new economy required improved transportation.

Food had to be transported to factory towns in far

greater quantities. Iron, coal, machinery, raw wool, and

cotton had to be brought together. Manufactured

goods had to be distributed. People had to be moved in

large numbers. The railroad solved these problems, but

the first steam locomotive was not built until 1804, and

the first public railway—the Stockton-to-Darlington

Railway—did not open until 1825. Railroads were the

culmination of industrialization in Britain, not a cause

of it.

Transportation in Britain had improved significantly in the century before 1825. The trip between

London and Edinburgh that took twelve days in 1734

required four days in 1762 and forty hours on the eve

of the railroad age. The chief developments in eighteenth-century transportation involved canal, road,

turnpike, and bridge building. Britain had two thousand

kilometers of canals in 1700 and sixty-five hundred

kilometers in 1830. Transportation on rivers and these

canals was the most efficient means of moving great

weights, such as shipments of iron and coal. The development of canals serving Manchester cut the cost of

coal to factory owners by 50 percent in the late eighteenth century, so the textile boom there owed more to

waterways than to railways. Canals and rivers, however,

had one major drawback: They sometimes froze in the

winter, ending the distribution of goods.

Many technical advances made the British transportation system the best in Europe. An ironmaster

named Abraham Darby III, whose family had built the

world’s largest blast furnaces and foundry, constructed

the world’s first iron bridge, a 295-foot-long “wonder of

the age” that amazed gawking tourists and changed

transportation. Similarly, a Scottish engineer named

John MacAdam improved roads—subsequently called

macadamized roads—by cambering them for drainage

and paving them with crushed stones. (The blacktopped road treatment known as macadam was named

in his honor, but it was not yet in use.) The improvement in highway transportation was so dramatic that

the coach companies began to remove the qualification

“God Willing” from their time schedules.

The railroad was the culmination of these trends

and was so successful that it ended the age of canals

and coaching. Railroads began with an old idea borrowed from the coal mines. Since the seventeenth century, collieries had used wooden rails to guide

horse-drawn coal wagons; by the 1760s many mines

were switching to cast iron rails. Richard Trevithick, an



424 Chapter 22

3 TABLE 22.4 3

The Beginning of the Railroad Age in Europe, 1825–50

Railway lines open, in kilometers

Country



1825



1830



1835



1840



1845



1850

10,662



United Kingdom



43



157



544



2,411



4,081



Austrian Empire



n.a.



n.a.



n.a.



144



728



1,357



France



n.a.



31



141



410



875



2,915



German States



n.a.



n.a.



6



469



2,143



5,856



Italian States



n.a.



n.a.



n.a.



20



152



620



Russia



n.a.



n.a.



n.a.



27



144



501



Spain



n.a.



n.a.



n.a.



n.a.



n.a.



28



n.a.



31



167



1,421



4,772



12,362



43



188



711



3,832



8,853



23,024



100



84



77



63



46



46



Total continent

Total Europe

Percent in United Kingdom



Source: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750–1970 (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 581–82.

n.a. ϭ Not available.



English mining engineer, won the race to develop the

first practical vehicle to carry passengers and goods, by

designing a high-pressure steam engine in 1800. In

early 1804 Trevithick’s locomotive, riding on colliery

iron rails, pulled five wagons containing seventy passengers and ten tons of iron ore, for a distance of 9.5

miles at a speed of nearly five miles per hour.

George Stephenson, an inventor who had devised

the miner’s safety lamp, built on Trevithick’s work to

start the age of railroad service. Stephenson built the

forty-three kilometer Stockton-to-Darlington in the

early 1820s to serve the heavy industries of the midlands—so the first train became known as Stephenson’s

Rocket. He then turned to a more important line, a railroad linking the mills of Manchester with the port of

Liverpool. Many people opposed this development,

and dire predictions were made of the impact of railroads: The smoke and sparks from coal-burning locomotives would kill flora and fauna, start wildfires, and

destroy foxhunting. When the Liverpool-Manchester

line opened in 1830, however, it carried 445,000 passengers and ninety-eight thousand tons of goods in its

first full year. Stephenson’s railroad was so successful

that, of the twenty-nine stage coach services between

Manchester and Liverpool in 1830, only one remained

in business in 1832.

On the continent, where rapid industrialization

did not begin until after the end of the Napoleonic

Wars in 1815, a railroad-building boom that started in



the late 1830s supported industrialization. For much

of the mid-nineteenth century, Britain kept a huge

lead in railroad lines, as it did in iron, coal, steam, and

textiles. Ten years after the Stockton-Darlington line

opened, no railroads had been built in Austria, the

Italian states, Russia, or Spain; all of the German states

combined contained only six kilometers of railroad

track (see table 22.4). Railroads were already changing

the continental economy, however. A railway connecting the Belgian seaport of Antwerp with the

Rhine River port of Cologne was inaugurated in 1843;

this Iron Rhine became one of the world’s industrial

arteries and made Antwerp the third largest port in

the world (after London and New York).



Q



The Urban World

The impact of industrialization upon European society

was most vivid in the growing cities. The population

explosion, the decline in agricultural employment, the

rise of the factory system, and the improvements in

transportation combined to uproot thousands of people. Young adults, and sometimes whole families, found

themselves so desperate for employment that they

chose migration to the growing factory towns.

Unprecedented growth changed the nature of

cities and urban life, but there was a range of types of



Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe 425

towns and cities. Older towns often still stood within

their medieval defensive walls. The urban and the rural

were intertwined in such towns, sometimes with farmland within the walls and usually with important farming surrounding the town. Urban families often still had

gardens or even orchards. Livestock lived inside the

towns, and it was not unusual to see a pig wandering

the streets. A 1786 census of Hanover—an important

German capital and the home of the English royal

family—found 365 head of cattle living within the

town walls, but no sidewalks, paved streets, or sewer

system. This remained true of the new industrial towns:

Transplanted animals lived alongside uprooted workers

in the shadow of the factory.

The modern city emerged painfully during the late

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. London began the

habit of numbering street addresses and invented sidewalks in the 1760s. Watt developed steam heating for

his office, and his steam pipes were the first central

heating. Experiments with the newly plentiful supply of

coal led William Murdock to the invention of indoor

lighting—the burning of coal gas to provide better illumination than candles did. By 1807 the city of London

was installing Murdock’s gaslights on the streets; by

1820 gaslights were common in the homes of the wellto-do. The 1820s also saw London and Paris invent

new public transportation systems: the horse-drawn

omnibus, soon supplemented by urban railroads. The

French Revolution led to a big change in city life—the

invention of the restaurant, a result of the emigration of

aristocrats who left behind many unemployed chefs. In

1789 Paris had only one restaurant (as distinct from

inns or cafes); in 1804 there were more than five hundred and the institution was spreading. By the middle

of the nineteenth century, the manufacturing economy

had created vast department stores (such as the Bon

Marché in Paris) and even arcade-shopping centers

(such as the Galleria in Milan).

Urban life during industrialization was not entirely

rosy. The industrial and manufacturing towns such as

Manchester, Essen, and L⁄ odz initially grew too fast for

amenities to keep pace with the population (see document 22.1). Housing, fresh water, sewers, and sanitation were dangerously inadequate. An attractive

environment (such as trees or clean air) or convenient

services (such as shops or schools) were rarer. Many

contemporaries recorded their horror at the sight of

factory towns. Charles Dickens depicted Manchester as

a dreadful place blackened by the soot of ubiquitous

coal burning. Elisabeth Gaskell, who rivaled Dickens

for vivid details, described the nightmare of life in such

conditions. In Mary Barton (1848), she depicted the



[ DOCUMENT 22.1 [

Charles Dickens Describes

Conditions in Manchester

Observers were often startled by living conditions in the early

industrial revolution, and many of them wrote vivid descriptions of what they had seen. The most famous include an unattractive portrait of Manchester in Charles Dickens’s novel

Hard Times (1854)

Coketown [Manchester] . . . was a town of red

brick, or of brick that would have been red if the

smoke and ashes had allowed it; but as matters

stood it was a town of unnatural red and black, like

the painted face of a savage. It was a town of machinery and tall chimneys, out of which interminable serpents of smoke trailed themselves

forever and ever, and never got uncoiled. It had a

black canal in it, and a river that ran purple with illsmelling dye, and vast piles of buildings full of windows where there was a rattling and a trembling all

day long, and where the piston of the steam engine

worked monotonously up and down like the head

of an elephant in a state of melancholy madness. It

contained several large streets all very like one another, and many small streets still more like one another, inhabited by people equally like one another,

who all went in and out at the same hours, with the

same sound upon the same pavements, to do the

same work, and to whom every day was the same

as yesterday and tomorrow, and every year the

counterpart of the last and the next.

Dickens, Charles. Hard Times. New York: T. L. McElrath, 1854;

and Tocqueville, Alexis de. Journeys to England and Ireland.

1835.



squalid conditions of life in a slum cellar, where starvation and typhus competed for the lives of a family

sleeping on beds of damp straw.

Even the old cities could not keep up with their

growth. In the Westminster district of London, residents living within one block of Parliament complained

to the government in 1799 about the stinking odor of

their street, which had not been cleaned of horse and

human waste in six months. In that same district of the

richest city on Earth, air pollution was so terrible during

hot weather that Parliament usually voted for an early

summer recess. But those who went north for the



Tài liệu bạn tìm kiếm đã sẵn sàng tải về

22 - Industrialization and the Social and Economic Structure of Europe.pdf

Tải bản đầy đủ ngay(0 tr)

×