Tải bản đầy đủ - 0 (trang)
REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY

REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY

Tải bản đầy đủ - 0trang

SIMON ROBERTSON



regulatory, while treating morality as one particular form of ethical outlook distinguished from others by the notion of obligation integral to it. Either way,

morality is a regulative enterprise. Defining it more precisely remains an ambitious task. Nevertheless, we can usefully circumscribe our topic as follows.

First, it is often said that modern morality represents a law-conception of

ethics structured through deontic concepts like moral right, wrong, obligation and

permissibility. Many take these to be inter-definable. For instance: “A’s doing x is

morally right” = “A has a moral obligation to do x” = “A is not morally

permitted not to do x”; “A’s doing x is morally wrong” = “A has a moral obligation not to do x” = “A is not morally permitted to do x.” (These equivalences

can be contested, though in this chapter I adhere to them.) Then there are also

evaluative concepts by which we appraise people’s actions, motives, and intentions; these include good, bad, better, worse, as well as thicker modes of assessment like generous, cruel, unfair. How the deontic and evaluative connect is

controversial; but we may provisionally place them together as forming part of

the normative realm.

Second, there are many approaches to characterizing morality – in terms of a

supposed (e.g. regulative) function, a distinctive (e.g. other-regarding) content, its

formal features (e.g. universalizability), its characteristic sentiments and sanctions

(e.g. blame and guilt). Each has its limitations and, arguably, ends up referring

back to more basic notions like obligation. In combination, though, they offer a

good indication of what morality involves. Let’s characterize it as a system of

thought and practice regulating relations between people via (generally otherregarding) obligations the violation of which merits blame. On a traditional view,

moral obligations are also normatively authoritative and universal. Whether

such features are essential to moral obligation remains disputed; we turn to such

issues shortly.

Third, while morality’s focus on action places it firmly within the practical

normative sphere, it plausibly extends beyond this to involve those aspects of

belief, feeling, and character that bear on conduct – what one is justified in

believing one ought to do in light of the available evidence, what it is reasonable

to feel in response to wrongdoing, which dispositions of character one should

cultivate. The interaction of belief, feeling, and action as they figure in moral

thought is a far-reaching topic. The rest of the chapter focuses on issues more

closely connected to the authority of morality.



Moral obligation and reasons

It is often said that morality embodies a claim to “objectivity.” This can mean

many things. In the context specifically of moral obligation, a common idea is

that whether a person has a moral obligation does not generally depend on that

person’s subjective desires, aims, ends, interests, and the like – or, as we may



434



REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY



collectively call these, the person’s “motives.” More precisely, if you have a

moral obligation, you have that obligation irrespective of whether doing as it

specifies either serves or conflicts with your motives. A further claim is that

moral obligations are objective in virtue of being normatively authoritative. This

too can mean many things, though a common thought is that morality represents

an authoritative standpoint because we necessarily have reason to do as it

demands. One way to explicate this generic idea is in terms of the conjunction of

the following two claims: first, that moral obligations entail normative reasons to

act, in that someone who has a moral obligation has a reason to do what it

demands; second, that the person has this reason irrespective of whether doing

as the obligation demands either serves or conflicts with the person’s motives.

For example, if you have a moral obligation to refrain from murder, you have a

reason to so refrain irrespective of whether committing the murder serves or

conflicts with your own subjective aims or interests. This section examines the

normative authority thesis.

To clarify what it involves, let’s begin by considering, and contrasting it to, the

following thesis:

(1) A has a moral obligation to do x ! A has that obligation whether or

not doing x serves A’s motives.

This is distinct from the idea that moral obligations are normatively authoritative, since it makes no claim about the connection between moral obligation

and reasons. By itself, (1) therefore leaves open whether someone who has a

moral obligation to do x thereby has a reason to do x. Whether a person does

have a reason to do what he has a moral obligation to do depends in part on

how we understand the expression “has a moral obligation,” for instance, as it

figures in the antecedent of (1). (1) could be read as saying “According to morality,

if A has an obligation to do x, A has that obligation whether or not doing x serves

A’s motives.” However, that could be true even if A has no genuine reason to do

x. For it doesn’t follow from the fact that some system of norms claims you have

an obligation to do something that you have a reason to do it. Philippa Foot

(1978) makes this point by considering duties derived from norms of etiquette. It

might be true, according to etiquette, that women are forbidden from offering their

hand when greeting men unless the man first offers his. But if such duties and

prohibitions are themselves frivolous nonsense, there may be no reason to comply

with them. Similarly, it may be true according to the laws of a fascist state that

you are legally required to engage in racist activity; but it doesn’t follow from

this that you actually have reason to do so. Whether you do have a genuine

reason to do what etiquette or the law requires depends on whether the demands

they make are demands there is reason to obey in the first place. If they do not

provide us with reasons, we might say that the standpoints they represent lack

genuine normative authority. Importantly, many who endorse (1) think morality



435



SIMON ROBERTSON



possesses a special kind of authority lacking in other putative requirements – and

that this consists in there being an essential connection between moral obligations

and what we genuinely ought and have reason to do. Before examining these connections, it will be useful to first introduce the concepts ought and a reason.

Oughts are typically taken to specify requirements or demands; they are

overriding and present conclusive normative verdicts. Thus if you ought to perform some particular action, there is no other action you ought to perform

instead. Reasons, in contrast, need not specify requirements: you could have a

reason to do something without being required to do it. A reason to perform some

action is usually understood as a consideration that counts in favor of doing it

(Scanlon 1998: Ch. 1; Dancy 2004: Ch. 2); but a reason can be just one consideration

amongst others, with there being many different reasons favoring many different

actions, not all of which you ought to perform. Nonetheless, many think there is

an intimate connection between oughts and reasons, so that:

(2) If A ought to do x ! A has a reason to do x,

even though the converse may fail.

If moral obligation has some essential connection with oughts and reasons, we

might then say that:

(3) A has a moral obligation to do x ! A ought to do x,

and/or:

(4) A has a moral obligation to do x ! A has a reason to do x.

(3) is stronger than (4). It captures a traditional thought that moral obligations are

overriding: your having a moral obligation implies not just that you have some

reason to do what it demands, but that you ought to do it (this is often labeled

the “moral ought” or “ought of moral obligation”). (4) follows from the conjunction of (2) and (3). Many endorse both (3) and (4), though one could accept

(4) but reject (3), and hence deny that moral obligations are always overriding.

Or one could accept (3) but deny (4), for instance, by denying (2). Alternatively,

one could deny both (3) and (4). Here we shall focus on (4) and its denial.

(4) represents a view sometimes called morality–reasons internalism (because the

connection between moral obligation and reasons it posits is often presented as

an internal or conceptual one, whereby it is part of the very nature or concept of

moral obligation that it entails reasons to act). Its denial, morality–reasons externalism, denies this conceptual connection and holds that A could have a moral

obligation to do x but no reason to do x. Both positions offer contrasting views

about the nature or concept of morality and its demands – whether, in particular, moral obligations are reason-entailing. There are a number of ways to



436



REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY



understand the connection (4) articulates. On the one hand, it could be read as

saying either that the moral obligation to do x provides A with a reason to do x,

or that the reason favoring x provides A with the obligation. On the other hand,

(4) could be understood as the claim that facts about moral obligation determine

facts about reasons, so that by establishing that A has a moral obligation to do x

we have therein established that A has a reason to do x; or it could be interpreted as a constraint on who has what obligations, so that if A has no reason to

do x then A has no moral obligation to do it. Since (4) can be interpreted in any

of these ways, to deny (4) is to deny each of these interpretations. Those who do

deny (4) deny that it is part of the concept of moral obligation that it entails

reasons. They hold that it is therefore possible that you have no reason to do

what you are morally required to do. This need not be to deny that you have

moral obligations, nor therefore that you act morally wrongly by violating them.

Nor even is it to deny that you can have good reason, indeed moral reason, to

do as morality requires. Denying (4) involves denying only that there is a necessary connection between moral obligation and reasons; the connection is instead

contingent. Many who deny (4) do so because they think that whether people

have reason to do as morality demands depends on their having suitably moral

sentiments and motives; to the extent most of us do, most of us may have reason

to do what we are morally required to do. Nonetheless, this is not guaranteed.

To assess the significance of (4) and its denial, it will be useful to introduce one

further distinction, this time concerning reasons themselves.

On one view, often called reasons internalism, for it to be true that you have a

reason to perform some action, acting for that reason must somehow serve your

subjective motives. On this view: A has a reason to do x only if A has some

motive that would be served by doing x (Williams 1981b). Thus, you have a

reason to go mountain climbing only if you have some desire, aim, end, or

interest that would be served by doing so; if you have no such motive, you have

no reason to mountain climb. Similarly, you have a reason to refrain from

murder only if you have some motive which would be served by so refraining; if

you have no such motive, you have no such reason. (Note that a person’s

motives can include moral motives, for instance, a desire to do the morally right

thing because it is morally right; so reasons internalism does not entail egoism.)

Reasons externalists, in contrast, hold that at least some reasons do not depend

on agential motives, so that you could have a reason to refrain from murder

irrespective of whether committing the murder would serve or conflict with your

motives. Hence, according to reasons externalism:

(5) For some reasons R, whether A has R does not depend on A’s motives.

If we combine (4) with the claim that the reasons entailed by moral obligation

satisfy (5), we arrive at the thesis that moral obligation is normatively authoritative. Thus the normative authority of moral obligation involves the following



437



SIMON ROBERTSON



conjunction of claims: that moral obligations do entail reasons to act (as in [4]),

and that the reasons entailed by moral obligation are reasons the person has

irrespective of his motives (an application of [5]). It follows that moral obligation

is universal to the extent that one does not escape having a reason to do what

one is morally obligated to do merely if or because one lacks suitably moral

motives. Furthermore, if we combine (4) with the claim that, whenever a person

has a moral obligation the reasons satisfying (5) generate an ought, we get one

version of the traditional claim that moral obligations present categorical (and

overriding) requirements: if you have a moral obligation to do x, you ought to

do x irrespective of whether doing x serves your motives. The claim that moral

obligation is normatively authoritative can be endorsed by a wide variety of

positions within normative ethics: Kantians and intuitionists do generally accept

it, but it is also open to utilitarians and others. However, one could reject it in a

number of different ways; here are some:

(a) Some deny morality’s commitment to both (4) and (5). This is in fact a

common approach amongst many contemporary naturalist moral realists

(e.g. Railton 1986). Such realists hold that moral facts (including facts about

moral right and wrong) are identical to or constituted by natural facts. They

therefore accept that moral facts are objective in one sense, since the natural facts they are related to are. Nonetheless, these realists deny that

moral obligation has to be objective in the further sense that it is normatively authoritative. Often they deny that moral obligations entail reasons

because they think that whether a person has reason to do as morality

demands depends on whether the person has suitably moral motives (i.e.

they often deny [4] because they deny [5]).

(b) One could instead accept morality’s commitment to (4) but deny its commitment to (5). If one also accepts a reasons internalist view, this provides a

constraint on the scope of moral obligation: you only have a moral obligation and thus a reason to do what it demands, if you have some motive

that would be served by doing so (see Williams 1995).

(c) Alternatively, some hold that it is part of our concept of morality that

morality is committed to both (4) and (5), but deny on substantive grounds

that any reasons satisfy (5). This signals an error theory about morality, or

at least those conceptions of it according to which moral obligation is

normatively authoritative (e.g. Mackie 1977; arguably Williams 1985). In

other words, error theorists might hold that, if there were any moral obligations, these would entail reasons to act irrespective of one’s motives; but

they deny that there are any such reasons – and they therefore deny that

there are any moral obligations thus construed.

(d) Or one could accept (5) (whether accepting [4] or not) but deny that the

reasons satisfying (5) are moral reasons. This is one way to be a non-moral

perfectionist, i.e. someone who thinks people might have reason to pursue



438



REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY



human excellences irrespective of their motives, but who holds that human

excellence is distinctively non-moral.

Since the crux of disagreement between those who do and do not think that moral

obligation is normatively authoritative lies in whether they think moral reasons

satisfy (5), it will be useful to consider the significance of (5) and its denial.

At one level, the debate between proponents and opponents of (5) is a substantive one, concerning the conditions under which people have reasons and

hence who has what reasons. For instance, denying (5) effectively concedes that

the sufficiently ruthless and amoral may have no reason to act morally well;

moreover, they may even have reason to act in ways most would think decidedly

immoral. Many who deny (5), however, argue that, even if reasons are contingent

on agential motives, most of us do have suitably moral motives and so do fall

within the scope of moral obligation; in which case, the denial of (5) does not in

fact generate implications as morally objectionable as some claim. Moreover, if

there really are people who lack any moral dispositions whatsoever, merely

attributing reasons to them will have little practical benefit anyway: it is unlikely

to affect their behavior, and they may just be people we have good reason to

avoid or protect ourselves against.

At a further level, though, the debate goes to the heart of issues about the

nature, justification and foundations of morality. Those who think morality is

normatively authoritative often argue that severing the connection between

moral obligation and reasons leaves us (at best) with an impoverished conception

of moral objectivity (for instance, by reducing moral facts to natural facts arguably lacking any genuine normative significance), or (at worst) fails to account for

morality as an essentially normative enterprise (making morality little more than

a system of norms on par with etiquette). Skeptics about (5), on the other hand,

think the view of reasons underpinning the aspiration to normative authority

untenable, often because they think it metaphysically mysterious (Mackie 1977:

Ch. 1) or because they find arguments for it systematically unconvincing (Foot

1978; Williams 1995). Many seek thereby to defend an alternative approach to

ethics. Some do so by preserving a conception of moral obligation not committed to the supposedly problematic picture of reasons the normative authority

thesis presupposes – this is the approach of those who combine naturalist moral

realism with reasons internalism. Others jettison moral obligation itself – this is

the approach of some virtue ethicists. These debates about reasons therefore

have wide-reaching implications. They remain live issues.



Values and morality

We have so far concentrated on connections between morality and reasons.

Another central element to morality, on many views, concerns value. In recent



439



SIMON ROBERTSON



moral philosophy debate about value has been extensive and diverse. Here I shall

broach three topics.

The first concerns the relation between value and moral obligation. Normative

moral theories are often divided into two opposing camps: deontological and teleological. One influential account of this distinction comes from John Rawls

(1972: 24–30). Taking the good and the right as our two main moral categories,

Rawls characterizes teleological moral theories as those that first specify the good

independently of the right and then define moral rightness as that which maximizes the good. Consequentialist theories are a paradigmatic example of a teleological approach: they hold that certain states of affairs are valuable and that the

rightness of an action (say) is determined solely by the value of the states of

affairs it brings about as its consequences. Classical utilitarianism, for instance,

conceives the good as pleasure and the absence of pain, specifying morally right

actions as those producing most overall good given the available alternatives.

Strictly speaking (contra Rawls), it is now widely agreed that teleological theories

are not committed to a maximizing view. For example, satisficing utilitarians hold

that you have a moral obligation only to bring about good enough outcomes,

where this may be less than the best possible; nonetheless, moral rightness is still

a function of goodness. Deontological moral theories, in contrast, do not define

moral rightness in terms of, or do not think it determined by, an independently

specified conception of the good. Different deontologists disagree whether the

consequences of an action can be relevant to determining its status as right,

wrong, or permissible; but all deontologists think there are factors besides the

value of an action’s consequences that are relevant to determining this. In particular, they think there are moral constraints on how we are permitted to pursue

the good, where such constraints operate independently of the value of outcomes. To take one example: Many forms of consequentialism are arguably

committed to the view that it could be required, or at least permissible, to frame

an innocent person for a crime if doing so would bring about best overall consequences – if, say, it would prevent significant social disorder. Deontologists,

however, would typically think this morally wrong, for instance, because it is

unjust or fails to respect the dignity of the innocent person as a free moral agent.

Thus even if framing the individual would bring about best overall consequences, the fact that this is unjust (say) may serve as a constraint that prohibits using the person as a means to that end. Teleological and deontological

approaches thus represent two rival conceptions of morality distinguishable by

the role they assign to value. Both remain leading players in contemporary normative ethics.

A second issue concerns the relation between values and reasons, moral, or

otherwise. Many teleologists and deontologists think there is indeed an intimate

connection between them; but there remains significant disagreement over how

they are related, in particular whether one is more fundamental than the other.

Value-based views hold that we have reason to do things because they are good;



440



REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY



reasons-based approaches deny this. One prominent reasons-based approach

emerges from what T. M. Scanlon (1998: 95–100) calls the “buck-passing”

account of (intrinsic) value. This clusters around a number of ideas. First, we

construct some biconditional linking values with reasons, a basic version of

which might claim that “x is intrinsically good if and only if there is reason to y,”

where “y” stands for some response to x – an action or pro-attitude, say – there

is reason to do or have. Second, buck-passers hold that it is not the quality of

being good which gives reason to y, but certain other (non-evaluative) features of

x. Third, they claim that to say that x is good just is to say that there is reason to

y with respect to x. Thus, for example, to say that mountain climbing is an

intrinsically valuable activity is to say that it has certain features (provides

opportunity to view stunning landscapes, to experience wilderness and tranquility, to overcome challenges, or so forth) which give people reasons – perhaps

reasons to do it or reasons to admire its leading exponents. If defensible, this

provides a way by which to analyze value in terms of the more basic notion of a

reason and to deny that value is the source of reasons. Combining it with (4) also

offers a way to unify the deontic and evaluative domains, since it allows that

both deontic and evaluative concepts entail the concept of a reason. Each of the

three theses comprising the buck-passing account may be contested, though.

Some deny the biconditional. On the one hand, it inherits many similar permutations to those that arose regarding the connection between moral obligation

and reasons. Reasons internalists, for instance, could endorse a substantive

account of value according to which the value of an action does not depend

on agential motives, yet also hold that you have reason to do or to have a proattitude towards what is good only if you have some motive that would be

served by doing so. On the other hand, some deny the biconditional in the other

direction, because they claim there can be reason to do or pro something that is

not intrinsically valuable. Suppose that I promise to pay you a vast sum of

money for admiring a dreadful musical composition lacking any aesthetic merit;

you may, so the objection goes, have good reason to form the attitude of

admiration even though the musical composition is not intrinsically valuable.

Alternatively, one could accept the biconditional but maintain that we have reasons to do or pro things because they are valuable; value-based approaches do

just this and typically hold that it is the quality of being valuable which provides

us with these reasons. Thus it may be the fact that mountain climbing is an

intrinsically good or worthwhile activity that gives us reason to do it, or to

admire those who do. There are, nevertheless, further responses one may make

to these objections; both the reasons-based and value-based approaches continue

to command adherents.

A third central topic concerns the role of non-moral value in moral theory.

Granting that there are a variety of non-moral values we have reason to pursue,

there emerges the possibility of conflict between the moral and non-moral.

A pressing issue for moral theories is whether they can (and to what extent



441



SIMON ROBERTSON



they should) accommodate individuals’ pursuits of non-moral goods. The distinction between moral and non-moral values is not always clear-cut; but the latter are

typically taken to include the sorts of relationships and personal projects that

give our lives meaning and can contribute to our living a good or flourishing

life – friendships and emotional attachments, artistic and sporting pursuits, projects embodying personal excellence, and so on. A generic concern is that morality might require us to sacrifice such goods and that this is a bad thing

(Williams 1981a, 1985: Ch.10; Wolf 1982). One source of this worry emerges

from the idea that the demands of morality represent an impartial standpoint

which has priority over the partial and subjective interests of individual agents.

For instance, classical utilitarianism may require each person to promote the

good of all impartially, since the good of one person is as valuable as the good of

any other; yet this may in turn require an individual to forgo the sorts of personal project constitutive of his own good if promoting the good of others will

have better overall consequences. Kantian theories may also be susceptible to a

version of this objection. For if they require a person to deliberate impartially by

abstracting from contingent facts about himself (including his subjective aims,

goals, interests, and other motives) when considering what to do, the person’s

subjective goals may become sidelined and thus eclipsed by the demands of

morality. On either theory, if moral obligation is both pervasive and overriding,

we may end up continually required to do as morality demands and hence not

permitted to pursue our own personal good. Many responses have been offered

on behalf of the moral outlooks so accused. Some concede that morality is

indeed intrusive and demanding in these respects – but argue that, given that we

are indeed able to help those less fortunate than ourselves, we ought to do so

even if that requires significant personal sacrifice. Others seek to make morality

less demanding, either by accommodating the legitimate pursuit of personal

goods within an impartial framework, or by preserving space outside of morality

within which to pursue non-moral goods. Thus we might treat moral considerations as presenting just one kind of reason alongside whatever non-moral

reasons we have, both of which may be relevant to determining what overall we

ought to do. If moral considerations are not always decisive in determining what

we ought to do, they needn’t generate an unremitting series of obligations. In

which case, even if moral obligations are overriding, they need not be pervasive;

thus they needn’t preclude the legitimate pursuit of non-moral goods.

Much more can be said both about these responses and the other themes the

chapter has introduced. By way of conclusion, it should be noted that the

objection just raised against obligation-centered moral theories has motivated

not only a variety of responses on behalf of morality but also an array of contrasting (notably virtue and feminist) approaches to ethics – approaches that

either do away with, or give less emphasis to, the notions of impartiality and

obligation that they see as part of the problem. Insofar as the notion of obligation is integral to “morality,” these may not be instances of morality in the



442



REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY



narrow sense but, rather, alternative ethical perspectives. Both styles of approach

are explored in the other chapters of Part IV of this volume.

See also Reasons for action (Chapter 24); Realism and its alternatives (Chapter

26); Error theory and fictionalism (Chapter 28); Consequentialism (Chapter 37);

Contemporary Kantian ethics (Chapter 38); Virtue ethics (Chapter 40); Feminist

ethics (Chapter 43); Morality and its critics (Chapter 45); Partiality and impartiality (Chapter 52).



References

Dancy, J. (2004) Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foot, P. (1978) “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” repr. in Virtues and Vices,

Oxford: Blackwell.

Mackie, J. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Railton, P. (1986) “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review 95: 163–207.

Rawls, J. (1972) A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scanlon, T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press.

Williams, B. (1981a) “Persons, Character and Morality,” repr. in Moral Luck, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

——(1981b) “Internal and External Reasons,” repr. in Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

——(1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana Press.

——(1995) “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” repr. in Making Sense of Humanity,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolf, S. (1982) “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy 79: 419–39.



Further reading

Cullity, G. and Gaut, B. (eds) (1997) Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University

Press. (A collection of essays on different approaches to practical reason and its connections

with ethics, with useful editors’ introduction.)

Darwall, S. (1997) “Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction,” in

S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton (eds) Moral Discourse and Practice, Oxford: Oxford

University Press. (Outlines further issues in debates about morality’s normative authority.)



443



37



CONSEQUENTIALISM

Brad Hooker

The definition of consequentialism

A consequentialist theory evaluates things exclusively in terms of consequences.

For example, beliefs could be evaluated in terms of the consequences of holding

them (an approach often called pragmatism). The most common forms of consequentialism, however, focus on the evaluation of acts and sets of rules. And

the rest of this chapter will stick to that focus.

The most familiar kind of consequentialism is the kind of utilitarianism

maintaining that an act is morally right if and only if no alternative act has consequences containing greater welfare (or net benefit), impartially assessed. In utilitarians’ impartial assessment of welfare, a benefit (i.e. addition to someone’s

welfare) or harm (loss to welfare) to any one individual gets the same weight as

the same size benefit or harm to anyone else. Thus, benefits and harms to

everyone count equally, no matter what his or her ethnic group, religion, wealth,

education, political views, talent, or conscientiousness; all that matters is the size

of the benefits and harms.

This kind of utilitarianism is maximizing in the sense that it calls for an act with

unsurpassed consequences (anything less than the best isn’t good enough,

according to act-utilitarianism). And this theory is direct in the sense that the acts

are assessed solely and directly by their own consequences (not, for example, by

whether the acts are allowed by the rules with the best consequences). Thus the

theory is known as maximizing act-utilitarianism.

While maximizing act-utilitarianism is the most familiar form of consequentialism, defining consequentialism so that this is the only form is a naive

mistake. Many self-described consequentialists explicitly reject maximizing actutilitarianism. Some consequentialists think welfare is not all that matters. Some

reject utilitarian impartiality. Some reject a requirement to maximize. And some

deny that acts are to be solely assessed directly by their consequences.

Given the disputes among consequentialists, consequentialism must not be

characterized in such a way as to imply that all forms of it are welfarist, impartial

in the way specified, maximizing, and direct. How should it be characterized?

What all consequentialists about the morality of acts agree on is that, where



Tài liệu bạn tìm kiếm đã sẵn sàng tải về

REASONS, VALUES, AND MORALITY

Tải bản đầy đủ ngay(0 tr)

×