Tải bản đầy đủ - 0trang
§5. Two Conceptions of Objectivity
that is true of a prior and independent order of moral values. This order
is prior to the criteria of reasonableness and rationality as well as prior to
the appropriate conception of persons as autonomous and responsible and
as free and equal members of a moral community. Indeed, it is that order
that settles what those reasonable and rational criteria are, and how autonomy and responsibility are to be conceived.
By contrast, in Kant’s doctrine, as we have interpreted it, a correct moral
judgment is one that conforms to all the relevant criteria of reasonableness
and rationality the total force of which is expressed by the way they are
combined into the CI-procedure. Kant thinks of this procedure as suitably
combining all the requirements of our practical reason, both pure and empirical, into one uniﬁed scheme of practical reasoning. This is an aspect of
the unity of reason. That procedure’s form is a priori, rooted in our pure
practical reason, and thus for us practically necessary. A judgment supported by those principles and precepts will, then, be acknowledged as correct by any fully reasonable and rational (and informed) person. This is
what Kant means when he says that these judgments are universally communicable.
. Now, a conception of objectivity includes an account of our agreement in judgments and of how it comes about. Kant accounts for this agreement by our sharing in a common practical reason. For this idea to succeed,
we must suppose, as Kant does, that no matter who applies the CI-procedure,
roughly the same judgments are reached, provided that the procedure is
applied intelligently and conscientiously and against the background of
roughly the same beliefs and information. Reasonable and rational persons
must recognize more or less the same reasons and give them more or less
the same weight. Indeed, for the idea of judgment, as opposed to the idea
of simply giving voice to our psychological state, even to apply, we must
be able to reach agreement in judgment, not of course always, but much
of the time, and in the light of what are viewed as publicly recognized
criteria of practical reason.
Moreover—and this is essential—when we can’t reach agreement, we
must be able to explain our failure. We must be able to refer to such things
as the difﬁculties of the question at hand: for example, the difﬁculties of
surveying and assessing all the evidence available, or the delicate balance
of competing reasons on opposite sides of the question. In such cases, we
expect that reasonable persons may differ. Disagreement may also arise
from a lack of reasonableness or rationality or conscientiousness on the part
of one or more persons involved. But if we say this, we must be careful
that the test of this lack of reasonableness or conscientiousness is not simply
the fact of disagreement itself, much less the fact that other persons disagree
with us. We must have independent grounds identiﬁable in the particular
circumstances for thinking that such causes of the failure to agree are at
. I believe that Kant’s conception of objectivity falls under the following
general characterization of objectivity: namely, moral convictions are objective if reasonable and rational persons who are sufﬁciently intelligent and
conscientious in exercising their powers of practical reason would eventually endorse those convictions, when all concerned know the relevant facts
and have sufﬁciently surveyed the relevant considerations. To say that a
moral conviction is objective, then, is to say that there are reasons sufﬁcient
to convince all reasonable persons that it is valid or correct. To assert a
moral judgment is to imply that there are such reasons and that the judgment can be justiﬁed to a community of such persons.
Moreover, this is normally sufﬁcient: it is not required that the correctness of the conviction enter into an empirical explanation of how we know
it is correct. In general, this explanation is trivial: we know that it is correct
because we have correctly applied the principles of practical reason.9 Of
course, Kant’s constructivism distinguishes his account of objectivity from
other such accounts. But his view is no less objective for that.
. Finally, to prevent misunderstanding, a further point about constructivism. No such view, including Kant’s, says that the facts relevant for
moral reasoning are constructed, any more than it says that ideas of reason
such as those of person and society are constructed.
To explain: we can distinguish two kinds of facts relevant to moral reasoning. One is appealed to in giving reasons as to why an action or institution is, say, right or wrong, or just or unjust; the other is the kind of facts
about what is unjust, or the nature of the virtues, or of the moral doctrine
9. As noted in the text, we may, however, seek an empirical explanation for the failure to
reach agreement, and this explanation may refer to psychological elements such as prejudice and
bias, or to various situational elements. Usually explanations of failure refer to things that interfere
with our ability to make reasoned and impartial judgments.
itself. To illustrate the ﬁrst kind: to argue that slavery is unjust, we appeal
to the fact that it allows some persons cruelly to demean and abuse others.
To illustrate the second: we may appeal straightaway to the fact that deceitful promises are unjust, or to the fact that indifference to the needs of others
is lacking in virtue. Finally, a fact about Kant’s moral doctrine itself is that
it distinguishes between duties of justice and duties of virtue.
With regard to the ﬁrst kind of relevant facts, a constructivist procedure
is framed to yield the principles and criteria that specify which facts about
actions, institutions, persons, and the social world generally are relevant in
moral deliberation. For the claim that slavery is unjust, relevant facts about
it are not when it arose historically, or whether it is economically efﬁcient,
but that it allows some persons cruelly to demean and abuse others. That
is a fact about slavery.
Moreover, the idea of constructing facts seems incoherent, while the
idea of a constructivist procedure yielding principles and precepts identifying which facts count as reasons is quite clear. Recall how the categorical
imperative procedure accepts some maxims and rejects others. The idea of
constructivism is that, apart from a reasonable constructivist conception,
facts are simply facts. What is wanted is a framework of reasoning within
which to identify which facts are relevant from the appropriate point of
view and to determine their weight as reasons. So understood, a constructivist moral doctrine is not at odds with our commonsense ideas of truth
and matters of fact.
With regard to the second kind of relevant facts—those about the moral
doctrine itself—we say that these are not constructed but rather are facts
about the possibilities of construction.10 When Kant elaborates his doctrine
from the fundamental ideas of reason expressed in the CI-procedure, it is
a possibility of construction, implicit in the family of conceptions and principles of practical reasoning that are the basis of the construction, that slavery
is unjust and that there is a basic distinction between the duties of justice
and the duties of virtue. We may think of these as analogous to the way
in which the inﬁnity of primes is viewed (in constructivist arithmetic) as a
10. The possibilities referred to here are those characterizing the moral or political conception
that meets the tests of objectivity discussed earlier in this section. It is such a conception that
possibility of construction.11 This analogy does not commit us to a constructivist view of mathematics: instead we use it to clarify the meaning of moral
and political constructivism. For this it sufﬁces to understand the analogy;
the truth of constructivism in mathematics is a separate matter.
§. The Categorical Imperative: In What Way Synthetic A Priori?
. To complete the account of constructivism, I consider what Kant means
in describing the categorical imperative as a synthetic a priori practical proposition (Gr II: ). Doing this will clarify the sense in which the moral
law constructs out of itself its own a priori object. In § we saw that rational
intuitionism also views the ﬁrst principles of morals as synthetic a priori
propositions. Of course, Kant means something quite different, but what?
You may ask: Why haven’t we done this sooner? After all, this is central
to Kant’s doctrine. The answer is that it’s best to have the constructivist
background already in place.
To begin with, the categorical imperative is a priori in Kant’s most general sense, that is, it is knowledge grounded on principles of (pure) reason.
But might someone discover that there is no a priori knowledge? He says
not (KP :): “There is no danger of this. It would be like proving by reason
that there is no such thing as reason. . . . [K]nowledge through reason and
a priori knowledge are the same thing.”
The CI-procedure is, then, a priori, assuming that it correctly formulates
the requirements of the categorical imperative through which the moral
law (an idea of reason) applies to us as ﬁnite persons with needs in the
order of nature.
I remark here that the idea of the a priori is much simpler in the case
of practical reason than it is in the case of theoretical reason. In the ﬁrst
11. For the idea of possibilities of construction, see Parsons’s account of constructivism in his
article “Mathematics, Foundations of,” pp. f. He says, “Constructivist mathematics would proceed as if the last arbiter of mathematical existence and mathematical truth were the possibilities
of construction,” where the possibilities in question are those of an appropriately idealized procedure. The remark in the text about the inﬁnity of primes rests on the fact that a constructivist proof
of their inﬁnity can be given.
Critique, we have to distinguish between the a priori in connection with
the understanding and its categories as well as in connection with reason
and the ideas of reason. Understanding and reason (Verstand and Vernunft)
have different roles in the overall structure of knowledge, and the categories
and the ideas of reason have their own distinctive roles. All of this must
be kept track of. And there are also the a priori intuitions of space and time.
By contrast, in the second Critique, there is only the a priori of practical
. Now, for Kant, there are two marks of a priori knowledge: necessity
and universality; and these marks apply to practical as well as to theoretical
(a) Necessity here means practical necessity: that is, what is required
by the principles of pure practical reason. So whatever is required by
the categorical imperative (via the CI-procedure) is practically necessary
(b) As for universality, this means that the requirements in question
hold for all reasonable and rational persons in virtue of their nature as
such persons, independently of any particular conditions of inclination and
circumstances that mark off one reasonable and rational person from another. Kant insists in the preface of the Groundwork (Pref:– [–] )
that “ ‘Thou shalt lie’ could not hold merely for men, other rational beings
having no obligation to abide by it—and similarly with all other genuinely
moral laws; that here consequently the ground of obligation must be looked
for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which
he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.”
So far, all this is quite straightforward. The categorical imperative is a
priori as grounded on pure practical reason; it is both practically necessary
and holds universally for all reasonable and rational persons; and the same
is true of particular categorical imperatives when the persons in question
are, like us, ﬁnite persons with needs and hence subject to that imperative.
We must be careful to distinguish, as we have done before, the categorical imperative from the hypothetical. Two differences are these:
First, the hypothetical imperative Kant regards as analytic and not synthetic, and it holds in virtue of empirical rather than pure practical reason.
For Kant, it is simply part of being rational that if we desire the end, we
also desire the (most effective) means. For him, there is no difﬁculty in