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§6. The Categorical Imperative:In What Way Synthetic A Priori?

§6. The Categorical Imperative:In What Way Synthetic A Priori?

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 



understanding how hypothetical imperatives can determine our will (Gr II:

 []). He doesn’t see it as a problem.

The second difference is that particular hypothetical imperatives are

conditional: they apply to us or not depending on our specific wants and

inclinations.

. As we might expect from these two differences, the difficulty with

understanding how the categorical imperative determines the will concerns

how we are to understand it as a synthetic a priori and practical proposition.

The problem is that in contrast with hypothetical imperatives, they are

unconditional, both in regard to the means they forbid us to adopt in pursuing our ends (these means are restricted by the duties of justice) and in the

obligatory ends they require us to give at least some weight to (these ends

are specified by the duties of virtue). Recall that to say that particular categorical imperatives are unconditional is to say that they apply to us whatever may be the ends sought by our interests and inclinations. But if that

is so, how is it possible that they can determine our will? What possible

foothold can they have in our person?

There is a parallel here, as Kant indicates in passing, with the problem

of synthetic a priori propositions in the first Critique. For in that work Kant

sees no difficulty in understanding how empirical concepts apply to objects.

They are abstracted from instances of those concepts met with in experience, and so we are assured of their objective reality: that is, we are assured

that those concepts can apply to objects of experience. After all, the basic

ones have been abstracted from instances to which those concepts already

did apply. But the categories of the understanding, such as the concept of

cause, are a priori and have not been abstracted from objects in experience,

so how can we be assured that they can apply to objects? Thus arises the

problem of the transcendental deduction.

. How are we, then, to understand the categorical imperative as

synthetic a priori? We have already noted the general sense in which this

imperative is a priori as arising from practical reason. But there is also a

special sense in which it is a priori: it formulates the requirements of pure

practical reason and so it is a priori with respect to empirical practical

reason.

The thought is that just as the categories of the understanding specify

a priori conditions for the possibility of the experience of objects, the cate[  ]



   



gorical imperative and particular categorical imperatives to which it leads

impose a priori constraints on the permissible exercise of empirical practical

reason (for our maxims must be acceptable to the CI-procedure). These

constraints are synthetic a priori because:

(i) they are imposed unconditionally on reasonable and rational

persons, and

(ii) they are imposed on such persons without being derived

from the concept of a person as reasonable and rational.



Hence they are both synthetic (as in [i]) and not analytic (as in [ii]).

This in fact is just what Kant says in Gr II:n. (): “Without presupposing a condition taken from some inclination I connect an action with

the will a priori and therefore necessarily. . . . Here we have a practical

proposition in which the willing of an action is not derived analytically from

some other willing already presupposed . . . but is on the contrary connected

immediately with the concept of the will of a reasonable being as something

which is not contained in this concept.”

I have simplified the footnote by omitting the parentheses. We can elaborate the footnote as simplified as follows: Without presupposing any particular ends wanted by natural desires, the CI-procedure connects an action

with what a reasonable and rational person ought to do. Here we have a

practical proposition in which what ought to be done is not derived analytically from other specific ends already presupposed, as in the case of hypothetical imperatives. Nor, on the other hand, is the action derived analytically from the concept of a reasonable and rational person, again as in the

case of hypothetical imperatives. Rather what such a person ought to do

in a particular case is worked out directly by the CI-procedure without the

intermediary of an end of specific natural desires.

. While this elaboration accurately describes how the CI-procedure

works, several questions remain to be settled.

(a) First, are particular categorical imperatives (particular duties of justice and duties of virtue) a priori? No, they are not: in arriving at them by

means of the CI-procedure, we rely on certain laws of nature and use various kinds of empirical knowledge about our social world. Of course, they

are unconditional in contrast with hypothetical imperatives. Thus it is no

objection to Kant’s view (as Mill mistakenly thinks it is; see Utilitarianism,

[  ]



 



Ch. V, paragraph ) that particular categorical imperatives are not a priori.

What is synthetic a priori is the moral law and the CI-procedure as its

procedural representation as it applies to us.

(b) Second, suppose it is objected that particular categorical imperatives

are really hypothetical and conditional, since the CI-procedure in arriving

at them relies on a conception of true human needs (or another like conception) at step ().

In reply, it suffices to remark (as we said in Kant V) that a conception

of these needs is a special conception of the good introduced to ensure

content for the moral law; introducing it meets a need of pure practical

reason. These considerations distinguish true human needs from particular

inclinations and wants as they arise in everyday life and prompt us to formulate (rational) maxims (hypothetical imperatives) at step (). This reply can

be strengthened by connecting these true human needs with our needs as

rational persons in the order of nature who need society, and so with the

conditions required for a viable social order and necessary for realizing our

rationality. This answer is suggested in section  at the end of the preceding

lecture.

(c) Third, does the CI-procedure take account of the consequences of

everyone’s acting from particular categorical imperatives? Yes, of course:

we see this from the comparison of adjusted social worlds at step (). A

moral conception that took no account of consequences at all (as it is sometimes said of Kant’s view) would be simply mad. The question is always

how to do so.

. To conclude: earlier we said that pure practical reason constructs out

of itself its a priori object, that is, the realm of ends as a commonwealth

of reasonable and rational persons that would exist in the order of nature

when all its members act from the moral law. We can now see that the

phrase “out of itself ” is an exaggeration; the metaphor is a bit out of control.

To correct this, we say instead that pure practical reason, as represented

by the three formulations of the categorical imperative, constructs its object

from the materials (the matter) presented to it by rational maxims at step ().

Alternatively, we can say that the procedure is a selection device: it

accepts some maxims (as generalized precepts) and rejects others according

to whether they meet the criteria of practical reason it incorporates. Like

a mathematical function, the CI-procedure is applied to something (as a

[  ]



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function is applied to a number) to give something else (a corresponding

number), and can’t, to speak accurately, produce its object out of itself.

Finally, at the end of Kant IV, we referred to the important passage in

the second Critique (KP :) where Kant says that the moral law gives

to the sensible world the form of an intelligible world by specifying through

the totality of the precepts it counts as valid the public order of a possible

realm of ends. This public order of a possible realm of ends is the a priori

necessary object of a will determined by the moral law. At KP : there

is another important passage cited already in Kant IV:

Through reason we are conscious of a law to which all our maxims

are subject as though through our will a natural order must arise.

Therefore, this law must be the idea of a supersensuous nature, a nature not empirically given yet possible through freedom; to this nature

we give objective reality, at least in a practical context, because we

regard it as the object of our will as pure rational beings.

The difference, therefore, between the laws of a system of nature

to which the will is subject and a system of nature which is subject to a

will (as far as the relation of the will to its free actions is concerned)

rests on this: in the former, the objects must be the causes of the

conceptions which determine the will, and in the latter, the will is the

cause of the objects. Hence, in the latter the causality of the objects

has its determining ground solely in the pure faculty of reason, which

therefore may be called pure practical reason.



Rather than simply say, as Kant does here, that “the will is the cause

of the objects,” we may elaborate: our will as pure practical reason constructs its own a priori object through the CI-procedure, which object is

the public moral order of a possible realm of ends. So for the members of

a realm of ends, their society as an object in the order of nature is not the

cause of the conception of their society that determines their will. Rather,

in constructing its own a priori object, their pure practical reason is free as

reason is free. It has the freedom of reason.



[  ]



K 

The Fact of Reason



§. Introduction

. Today I discuss the fact of reason, one of the central ideas of Kant’s moral

philosophy. This idea appears for the first time in the Critique of Practical

Reason, and focusing upon it is one way to approach that work.

I begin by stating the question that the doctrine of the fact of reason

addresses. Recall that the first two chapters of the Groundwork are said by

Kant to be merely analytic: the first develops an argument to the moral

law (sketched in Kant I) from our commonsense concept of moral worth

of character, and the second chapter presents the three formulations of the

categorical imperative. But at the end of chapter II (Gr II: [–]), Kant

says:

Any one . . . who takes morality to be something, and not merely a

chimerical idea without truth, must admit the principle we have put

forward. This chapter . . . like the first, has been merely analytic. In

order to prove that morality is not simply a phantom of the brain—

a conclusion which follows if the categorical imperative, and with it

the autonomy of the will, is true and is absolutely necessary as an a

priori principle—we require a possible synthetic use of pure practical reason. On such a use we cannot venture without prefacing it by a critique

of this power of reason itself—a critique whose main features, so far

as sufficient for our purpose, we must outline in our final chapter.

[  ]



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What is involved here is Kant’s view that for a concept to have objective

reality—that is, for it to be applicable to something and in that sense true—

it is not sufficient that it have an analysis that shows it to be consistent and

intelligible. For all he has done in the first two chapters of the Groundwork,

the moral law may still be only a “chimerical idea.” What Kant wants to

show is that the moral law does apply to something, and in particular, that

it applies to us; for if it does, then we can act from that law and not merely

in accordance with it.

. I recall from Kant II two of the essential conditions that we said any

account of the categorical imperative must satisfy.

First, the content condition: the categorical imperative must not be

merely formal but must have sufficent structure to specify requirements

on moral deliberation so that suitably many maxims are shown to be fit

or unfit to be made universal law. Otherwise the moral law would be empty

and without content.

Second, the freedom condition: the categorical imperative must represent the moral law as a principle of autonomy, so that from our consciousness of this law as supremely authoritative for us (as reasonable persons),

we can recognize that we can act from the principle of autonomy as a

principle of reason.

The explanation of these two conditions is as follows. The aim of the

second Critique is to show that there is pure practical reason and that it

actually shows its existence in our thought, feeling, and conduct, or in what

Kant calls “the fact of reason.” Put another way, the aim of the second

Critique is to show that pure reason can be practical and can directly determine our will (KP :). But pure reason cannot do this if it is merely formal

and lacking in content. It would be empty; anything we did would satisfy

it. Hence the first (content) condition.

The reason for the second condition is this: only if the moral law is a

principle of autonomy in Kant’s sense can this law and our capacity to act

from it disclose our freedom to us, that is, disclose both our independence

of the natural order (negative freedom) and our capacity to act from principles of pure practical reason with a definite content (positive freedom).

Hence the second (freedom) condition.

. But plainly, since the moral law is simply an idea of reason, the first

two conditions do not alone suffice for the objective reality of pure practical

[  ]



   



reason. It is further essential that we be conscious of the moral law as

authoritative for us, and that it is possible for us to act from that law, not

merely in accordance with it. Thus there are two further conditions as

follows:

Third, the fact of reason condition: our consciousness of the moral law

as supremely authoritative for us as reasonable and rational persons must

be found in our everyday moral thought, feeling, and judgment; and the

moral law must be at least implicitly recognized as such by ordinary human

reason.

Fourth, the motivation condition: our consciousness of the moral law

as supremely authoritative for us must be so deeply rooted in our person

as reasonable and rational that this law by itself, when fully known and

understood, can be a sufficient motive for us to act from it, whatever our

natural desires.

Kant holds that if these four conditions are satisfied, then there is pure

practical reason. These conditions are both necessary and sufficient. In the

second Critique, he maintains that they are indeed satisfied and hence that

pure practical reason exists and that we are free from a practical point of

view.



§. The First Fact of Reason Passage

. There are altogether six fact of reason passages, as I shall call them. For

expository purposes, let’s think of them as extending over a number of

paragraphs, even though a reference to the fact of reason may occur only

once. The fact of reason is mentioned one or more times at eight places

(KP :, , , , , , , ), but some of these belong to the same

passage. Either the whole phrase “das Faktum der Vernunft” or simply “ein

Faktum” occurs; in the latter case, the context makes it clear that the fact

of reason, or a fact related to this fact, is meant. The six fact of reason

passages are these:

(a) The Preface –: the first eight paragraphs with the phrase

“ein Faktum” occurring only in paragraph .

(b) In Analytic I –: starting with the statement of Problems

I and II in §§– and continuing to the end of the statement

[  ]



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(c)



(d)

(e)

(f )



of Theorem IV but not including the remarks. There are

three explicit references to the fact of reason, all in §.

In the first Appendix to Analytic I –: the whole appendix except for the last paragraph. It may be divided into

three parts: paragraphs –, paragraphs –, and paragraphs

–.

In the second Appendix to Analytic I f.

In the Elucidation –: paragraphs –.

In the appendix to the Elucidation –: paragraph .



. I begin with the first passage, which opens the Preface, and, as I shall

do in each case, I note only the more important points, as time permits.

This passage introduces the main themes of the work. To appreciate the

significance of the first sentence, recall that in the Groundwork, Kant had

said that the only foundation of a metaphysic of morals is a critique of pure

practical reason, just as a critique of pure speculative reason is the only

foundation for a metaphysic of nature.



Why this critique is not called a Critique of Pure Practical Reason but

rather simply Critique of Practical Reason, though the parallelism

between it and the critique of speculative reason seems to demand the

latter title, will be sufficiently shown in the treatise itself. Its task

is merely to show that there is a pure practical reason, and, in order

to do this, it critically examines reason’s entire practical faculty. If

it succeeds in this task, there is no need to examine the pure faculty

itself to see whether it, like speculative reason, presumptuously

overreaches itself. For if pure reason is actually practical, it will show

its reality and that of its concepts in action [in der Tat], and all disputations which aim to prove its impossibility will be vain. (KP :) (Kant’s

italics)



To see what Kant means by the title without the word “pure,” distinguish two senses of critique implicit in his remarks in the Preface to the

first Critique (nd. ed., Bxxxii–xxxvii). In one sense, a critique involves giving

an overall account of the concepts and principles of reason as one unified

[  ]



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system of concepts and principles. The aim is to set out the whole constitution of reason.

In the other sense, critique means the criticism of reason, for although

it is part of Kant’s conception of the unity of reason that all of the concepts

of reason and their associated principles have a correct and valid use,

and therefore a proper place in the constitution of reason as an organic

whole (KR Bf.), there is also a natural dialectic by which our human reason is misled and its concepts and principles are fallaciously employed.

With pure speculative reason, this dialectic is profoundly deceptive, as

Kant tries to show in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique. Thus

it is part of the sense of the title of the book to inform us that it seeks to

expose the deceptive power of the natural dialectic of pure speculative reason and of the improper use of its concepts and principles in speculative

metaphysics.

. The opening paragraph of the Preface of the second Critique hints at

Kant’s view that there is no need for a critique of pure practical reason in

the sense of a criticism of reason. Rather, the task is to show that there is

pure practical reason, which exhibits its reality in our moral thought, feeling, and conduct. From the introduction (KP :) we know that for Kant,

whether there is pure practical reason depends on whether pure reason

is sufficient of itself to determine our will and so on whether our will is

free. The significance of the fact of reason is that pure practical reason

exhibits its reality in this fact and in what this fact discloses, namely, our

freedom. Once we recognize the fact of reason and its significance, all

disputations that question the possibility of pure practical reason are vain.

No metaphysical doctrines or scientific theories can put it in jeopardy.

We may not be able to comprehend how we can be free, but that we are

free from the point of view of practical reason, there is no doubt. Kant

says (KP :): “Practical reason itself, without any collusion with the speculative, provides reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom. This [freedom] is a practical concept and as such is

subject only to practical use; but what in the speculative critique could

only be thought [as possible] is now confirmed by fact [durch ein Faktum

bestaătigt].

. Since the word pure is not used in the title of the second Critique,

[  ]



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