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Chapter 5: Institutional Redesign Proposals for the Preparation of Criminal Policy by the Government. The Focus on Ex Ante Eva...
Having already reached the limits of life imprisonment,2 it might be thought that
this dynamic is arriving at a cul-de-sac from which there is at present no way out for
our governments. But there is still some way to go along present lines: post-crime
security measures, ignominious punishment, physical punishments, etc., and, in
addition, the evolution of comparative Criminal Policy provides us with examples
from other areas to employ in the search for new forms of punishment.3
Nevertheless, criminal and criminological scholars have not been able to offer
convincing alternatives for political authorities in this recent punitivist era that
culminate in the express reintroduction of life imprisonment in Spain. Perhaps this
indicates the need for a different strategy with which to confront the future.
With regard to academics and professionals associated with Criminal Policy,
indications of this new strategy are already starting to show, such as the role
recently played by some of them on an expert lobby group.4 Other works must be
added to these labours of external control with the aim to impact not only on the
rather fundamental contents of Criminal Policy, but also on its processes. These are
the premises on which this work is founded, in which I intend to discuss in part how
Criminal Policy is approached in Spain but, above all, how it could be done in such
a way that it could, presumably, yield better results. My objective is to arrive at that
purpose with a certain level of detail, proposing who should do what, when and in
I will defend the suitability, in my opinion, of evaluation knowledge for the
improvement of Criminal Policy (Mears 2010, p. 44 f.). It is increasingly evident
that legal aspects of Criminal Policy can benefit from other fields of knowledge in a
profound way5 and it is not by chance that, in Spain, some of the scholars interested
in this subject matter, have taken firm steps to inquire into disciplines more or less
distant from Law, such as Economics, Criminology, and Political Science.
In effect, the study of public decisions that govern the creation of criminal
policies requires a holistic approach, the only way to understand the dynamics
I am assuming as a fact that revocable life imprisonment will be finally incorporated in the reform
of the Criminal Code that was under debate in the Senate at the time of writing these lines.
In relation to the limitations of political, civil and social rights, unrelated or only slightly so, with
the crime that was committed, see an analysis of the situation in the USA and the European Nordic
countries in Dı´ez Ripolle´s (2014), p. 5.
Although it is not something completely new, the lobbying recently led by the Criminal Policy
Studies Group does appear to me to be of special intensity. In relation to the reform of the Criminal
Code put before the Spanish Parliament in September 2013, this Group has articulated a combined
strategy of presence in the media, meetings with parliamentary groups, appearances at the Justice
Committee of the Congress of Deputies [Spanish Lower Chamber] (muy bien esto), preparation of
documents as well as the organization of simultaneous events at various universities reading a
manifesto and explaining its point of view on the reform. See as an example, the news item
“Juristas contra el Co´digo Penal [Jurists against the Criminal Code]” (http://cadenaser.com/ser/
2015/03/04/tribunales/1425425154_088827.html), last visited 22 March 2015.
See the report of the Commission for The Study And Creation Of A National Agency For The
Evaluation Of Public Policy (p. 21). Available at: http://www.aeval.es/export/sites/aeval/comun/
5 Institutional Redesign Proposals for the Preparation of Criminal Policy by. . .
that shape those policies. One alternative is to pay attention to specific aspects, such
as the study of the actors that participate in Criminal Policy making, for example.
However, the correct interpretation of the findings will be difficult without the
knowledge of other previous or subsequent phases, or the legal powers of different
public bodies and institutions that participate in the process.6
This work seeks to contribute to completing the map that will allow us a better
understanding and management of the dynamics that govern Spanish Criminal
Proposals for Institutional Redesign
My intention over subsequent pages is to propose specific reforms thanks to which
Spanish institutions would be in a better position to confront the challenges of
Criminal Policy nature. These reforms will focus on the bodies that configure
Criminal Policy and on the contributions that may be made to them from various
disciplines, especially from a public policy evaluation perceptive.
In the Criminal Policy context, the evaluation of programmes in Spain finds
itself in a situation of absolute abandonment. Together with that, the interesting
initiatives that have been developed over recent years on policy evaluation have yet
to reach measures of a criminal nature.
As Medina Ariza made clear in relation to the introduction of situational crime
prevention policies in Spain:
Our society, in general, does not evaluate or evaluates little. The greater part of political
actions and reforms that are carried out are inspired by comparative experiences, by criteria
of an ideological sort, or by popular theories of social reality (Medina Ariza 2011, p. 372).7
This is why my proposals will centre on trying to provide institutional spaces for
evaluation tasks in those bodies that should take charge of it. Due precisely to my
focus on institutions, I will make proposals for the governmental or pre-legislative
phase; in other words, in relation to the preparatory tasks of public policy proposals
by Government, something which normally but not always takes the form of a bill.
I will therefore give no consideration in this work to both the sociological
process prior to Government actions in which the mass media, the general public
and different actors reflect a concern related to criminality8; as well as to the
subsequent introduction of the proposal in Parliament for debate in both chambers.
Ibidem, p. 24.
The work of Medina Ariza is filled with concrete references to significant shortcomings in the
evaluation of different crime prevention models, an especially serious situation in Spain.
See the analysis of this sociological process prior to placing social problems on the public agenda
in Dı´ez Ripolle´s (2003), pp. 20–49; and in Ruiz Seisdedos and Ortega Pe´rez (2005), p. 127 f.
In this context, therefore, a first question in relation to the preparation of public
policies of a criminal nature by the Government may be formulated: is our governmental structure prepared to approach the drafting of Criminal Policy with a certain
expectation of success? Anticipating my response to this question, another one is
raised: what may we do to improve the situation?
I seek to provide a response to both questions in the following pages.
The Pre-legislative or Governmental Phase
Despite the multiple actors that can intervene in the preparation of a legislative
proposal to be put before Parliament, it is well known that Government usually
assumes a leading role which will allow it to direct all of this phase practically at
will. In one way, this situation is logical, as legislative activity is the principal tool
that Government has for the development of the political programme for which it
Therefore, this governmental leadership is reasonable from the perspective of
the stability of political institutions and their capability for action.10 However, if we
analyze it from the perspective of democratic plurality or checks and balances in the
distribution of powers in our country, such a concentration can be turned into an
overbearing capability to place government criteria over and above any other
political or social actor.
Precisely as a consequence of this second argument, in which the preparation of
more pluralist legislative proposals would be missing, I think it is open to criticism
the fact that Government is allowed to present its proposals before Parliament
without even hearing any other opinion apart from its own. The intervention of
other actors that could contribute with relevant information and criteria on Criminal
Policy decision-making appears rather convenient. This does not refer so much to
political consensus but to technical and/or scientific consensus.
With such an objective in mind, I will defend a sort of distribution of tasks
between Government and Parliament. Thus, the activity of the former would have
to concentrate its attention on fields of expertise when constructing Criminal Policy
See for a quantitative and comparative analysis of the proportion of legislative initiatives from
government among the norms finally approved since 1989 up until 2008 in Becerra Mu~
And even recommendable, taking account of the serious consequences that the balance of
parliamentary majorities may have in systems such as the United States. In that country, following
the 2014 midterm elections, the Republican Party controlled the House of Representatives and the
Democratic Party, the Federal Government. Governability was therefore very difficult since
President Obama held the power to veto parliamentary initiatives and the House of Representatives can overturn legislative proposals from the Government. This situation does not however
apply to Spain where national elections are single events, the results of which return a parliamentary majority that chooses the President.
5 Institutional Redesign Proposals for the Preparation of Criminal Policy by. . .
(especially in those within its own Administration), while legislative power, in turn,
should occupy itself with the conflicting arguments between political groups and
the various stakeholder organizations and associations outside the Administration.
This separation of roles seeks to be a juridical-political orientation for the
actions of Government and Parliament, and in no case into an obligation that
would restrict the independence of these fundamental powers. In this sense, I am
not defending that Government should deny a hearing to a professional association
because a proposal is still in a pre-legislative phase. Such intention would be, not
only out of place, but also totally illusory. What I seek to do with this specific
separation of tasks is to ensure that social participation and ideological debate do
not work to the detriment of the necessary expert’s debate on Criminal Policy. This
expertise, although still far from offering absolute solutions, is available to provide
context, as well as calm and in-depth analysis to the deliberation.
The objective of all this is to be able to have not only a political but also a
technically powerful government. A government that is especially capable of undertaking ex-ante evaluations, as we shall see, with the knowledge and the means that
allow it to direct a complex process in which political will related to the available
alternatives may be integrated from an ideological but also an expert standpoint.
My proposal will maintain Government as the executive centre of decisionmaking and in control of the whole process. In my opinion, it is a matter of
grounding its leading role in something more than political power, thereby consolidating a preeminent position that is also based on an organizational structure as
well as on professionalized and stable procedures.
This new distribution of roles that I propose requires various steps: in the first
place, we should identify the governmental agency that will drive and lead the
pre-legislative phase in criminal matters; it is also necessary to define who will take
part in the aforementioned internal network involved with the Government in that
task (and who will inevitably be left out); and, finally, I will make some proposals
pertaining to the processes that should be available to carry it all out.
The Criminal Policy Division
In the first place, therefore, I believe it is central to identify an agent that is capable
of managing the preparation of Criminal Policy proposals within Government.
Something that involves, I believe, the formation of a new body within the Ministry
of Justice: a Criminal Policy Division.11 The fundamental role of this Ministry in
The present configuration of the Spanish Ministry of Justice contrasts with the general pattern in
other western democracies in which bodies with specific duties in criminal matters exist. These are
units that in various ways combine two fields of knowledge: criminal matters expertise on one side
and specific skills on legislative technique on the other. All of this is lacking in Spain. For a more
detailed comparative analysis, see Becerra Mu~
noz (2013), pp. 356–360.
matters concerning Criminal Policy within Government bodies makes it, I believe,
into the ideal place in which to apply these reforms.12
The staff of this new Division should be stable and specialized in CriminalPolicy matters; in other words, they should combine legal and criminological
knowledge, although other relevant professional profiles should not be discarded
(Dı´ez Ripolle´s 2003, p. 46). For example, knowledge related to the way public
administrations work, or to public policies management should be highly
A good example of such model is the Office of Policy and Legislation in the
United States, in which law scholars and policy analysts exercise different and
complementary abilities. The former is in charge of the preparation of legislative
proposals and the subrnission of comments with regard to legislation that is
underway, while the latter studies criminal legislation that is put into practice, as
well as the criminal justice system, from the standpoint of public policy and
management. In addition, they work on the identification of problems and tendencies in relation to these matters, they analyse federal data and statistics, define
alternative measures and prepare recommendations.13
Such tasks distribution shows us another way of approaching Criminal Policy:
from a broad perspective, capable of using instruments of intervention that are not
always fixed on the limited horizons of the Criminal Code.
Such a body, with the features I will specify, would be in an unrivalled position
to perform an authentic assessment in the purest political and criminal terms, with
capacity for feedback and growth through its experience with successive interventions. It would differentiate itself from bodies with a much closer relation to the
political strategy of the Ministry, like the Minister’s Cabinet Office, with which it
would have to establish close working relations.
The Role of the Criminal Policy Division
in the Definition of Problems and Agenda Setting
Looking at the tasks undertaken by this Division during the process of drafting
Criminal Policy in a little more depth, it would already have an important advisory
role with Government in the first moments of the definition of the problem. It is still
a question of the first stages of the pre-legislative phase, informal spaces in which
social demands continue to gain ground, but in which a certain sort of analysis of
the emerging situation is crucial.
For a quantitative analysis of the participation of the Spanish Ministry of Justice in legislative
drafts on criminal matters from 2004 to 2010, see Becerra Mu~
noz (2013), pp. 529–531.
See the webpage of the Office of Policy and Legislation at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
about/opl.html. Last accessed 22 March 2015.
5 Institutional Redesign Proposals for the Preparation of Criminal Policy by. . .
Precisely because we find ourselves in an early phase, this initial work centres on
ordering what will probably be an amalgam of various problems difficult to identify
and distinguish among each other (Quade 1989, p. 99). This is probably the stage at
which the Government should react with greater speed in the face of successive
events around it. Typically, it will be a matter of temporary but intense attention
from the mass media surrounding a tragic criminal event that monopolizes their
attention for different reasons.
Anybody who follows daily news knows that there will be no time to carry out
complex studies or evaluations before the Government receives a telephone call
requesting it to state its position on the matter. Moreover, there are chances for the
issue to be placed on the public agenda if it has the right characteristics, which
would mean we would be facing crucial moments for the future Criminal Policy. In
such situation the initial response can seriously influence subsequent decisions on
the matter, being even able to influence the features of the problem itself (Parsons
2007, p. 120).
In such situations, the value of a stable body, able to accumulate experience and
knowledge on Criminal Policy issues becomes of great importance due to the
recurring nature of public policies, which ensures continual reopening of debates
on matters to which responses have been sought on earlier occasions.14 It is highly
likely, therefore, that the specific criminal problem can be tacked with existing
information on possible strategies, but for which experience and management skills
are needed to deliver a fast response both politically and technically appropriate.
It is reasonable to think that we find ourselves up against a constant and tiring
return of Criminal Law reforms at least partly because of the difficulties that
governmental agencies face to respond quickly and accurately to these types of
demands. An amendment to a criminal piece of legislation is a cheap alternative
(Pe´rez Cepeda 2007, p. 382) and it guarantees an advantageous position in the two
possible scenarios: on the one hand, if the Government finally decides to intervene
on the subject, it will introduce a bill in Parliament, which will have every
possibility to be passed. In case it finds no support, it could always be claimed
that action was taken and blame it on other parliamentary groups, especially the
opposition, that made it impossible to reach consensus over the proposal.
On the contrary, there may be no real intention whatsoever of amending the
legislation, but simply of managing the crisis in the best possible way until another
matter captivates public attention. In such case using a statement similar to this:
“the Government is working on a legislative proposal to bring to Parliament” will
buy time. This technique is also useful to water down public demands in potentially
everlasting and opaque parliamentary procedures.
There will therefore be cases in which the Government will not really have a
great interest in approving a quality policy in criminal matters, but it will in others.
Such recurring nature of policies is an unquestioned idea in Political Science. See Quade
(1989), p. 74.
In this second case, both the risks and the opportunities differ from those pointed
Various authors have worked on the underlying motives for the selection of
certain matters worthy of attention from political leaders, especially in criminal
matters. Although this is not the place to go into them, I will mention an interesting
argument according to which public authorities, especially the Government, have a
reduced margin of real influence in criminality related problems. We frequently
speak of criminality as the last link in a chain that has its beginnings in matters in
which intervention is either not desired or not possible ata given moment: poverty,
social marginalisation, unequal distribution of wealth, etc. All of it contributes to a
superficial problem definition when it comes to criminality and to a search for direct
connections with most evident social concerns. As a consequence, problems of
enormous complexity are interpreted and approached, that is, defined, in very
simple and partial terms, something that in most cases turns into the amendment
of criminal legislation under the argument that problems of this nature are exclusively normative or related to a proper adjustment between the law and social
reality (a reality that will be radically modified as soon as there are changes on its
As Redondo Illescas and Garrido Genove´s argue: “Criminal policies work in an
unscientific manner, in general, in other words with total ignorance of the available
knowledge or, even worse, in an counter-scientific way, doing exactly the opposite
to what criminological knowledge prescribes” (Redondo Illesca and Garrido
Genove´s 2013, p. 126).
This being the situation, my proposal intends to contribute to change the situation,
but instead of doing so through direct confrontation with its premises and consequences, and using Criminal Law principles as benchmarks (legal certainty, ultima
ratio, division of powers, equality, etc.; something necessary and I have done on
other occasions), I will seek to promote an alternative course of action.
That is why from the first stages in the definition of the problem, the objective of
the Criminal Policy Division will be to foster a more technical organizational
culture in the Ministry of Justice and the Government to supervise the passage of
matters from the systemic agenda, where demands from society are picked up, to
the institutional agenda, where matters on which authorities decide to take action
are placed.16 In other words, it is a question of interposing a barrier based on
Criminal Policy deep knowledge to provide an appropriate response to the pressures
that every decision-making body faces when drawing up its institutional agenda
(pressures not only coming from the general public, but also from various
For all, see Brandariz Garcı´a (2014), pp. 99–104. “Civil servants may design security policies
that operate, above all, at a communicative level (. . .) the fundamental objective of which is to
mitigate indignation and collective fear, as means of restoring credibility in institutional capacity
to control crime”.
On both concepts, see Ruiz Seisdedos and Ortega Pe´rez (2005), p. 120 f.
5 Institutional Redesign Proposals for the Preparation of Criminal Policy by. . .
stakeholders calling for their interests to be considered17). What doubt is there that
the Government should have a series of instruments available for better decision
making in the interlude between both points in time.
The Increase of Criminal-Policy Options
The definition of problems and agenda setting are activities that determine the
following task in which the Criminal Policy Division should play a relevant role:
the description and selection of possible alternatives.
Solutions focused on legislative reform should no longer be the usual procedure
of the Spanish legislator, for which an assessment capable of offering realistic
non-legislative alternatives is fundamental: management reforms such as checking
whether the material resources and staff assigned to the implementation of a
measure are sufficient; the request for research about the characteristics of certain
criminal issues, or of evaluations of policies related to them; the use of communication campaigns to raise community awareness about certain matters; the increase
of coordination with other ministries and administrations in a joined response to an
identified problem; the support of implemented and trustworthy measures; or,
simply, the conviction that a rare event has occurred and the trust on the instruments
already in force. All these are generic non-legislative alternatives, or at least not
exclusively legislative, which consider public criminal politics as a much broader
and complex system than those exclusively related to legal rules.
To diversify the alternatives that are usually contemplated, Criminal Policy
Division staff will have to intercede in a very much consolidated dynamic in
Spain, which provides significant benefits to their users: the communicative relationship that exists between political power, the mass media and a society terrified
by crime (Brandariz Garcı´a 2014, p. 102; Pe´rez Cepeda 2007, p. 379 f.).
It will obviously not be an easy task and neither am I defending the creation of an
body with which I ingenuously seek to introduce a sort of Trojan horse into our
executive power. We should not forget that the Criminal Policy Division will be
part of the Ministry of Justice and will, therefore, be under the ministry’s command.
I believe that if my proposal aims to be reasonable and realistic, it should focus,
rather than in an improbable change in policy orientation, in two questions of a
pragmatic order, which could constitute a good foundation: the training of its staff
and the information that it should manage.
An example of such pressures is the frequent reference to international commitments. See, on
this, “Co´digo Penal: ¿do´nde esta´n los crı´menes ma´s graves?”, El Paı´s newspaper, 20/03/2010,
where the president of Amnesty International Spain criticized the Criminal Code reform that began
in 2009 because of certain “omissions” in matters contemplated in such norms as the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, the Convention Against Torture and the UN International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.
With regard to the first question, the training of its staff, the hard core of this
Division would be composed of expert staff in criminal matters: criminal lawyers
and criminologists. However, other professional profiles could be of great help such
as, for example, I.T. experts for the construction of new communication networks,
databases and records; economists to carry out cost-benefit and cost-efficiency
evaluations of the different policy alternatives; engineers for the evaluation and
improvement of processes; etc.
To support the idea of professional diversification I will refer, for example, to the
terrible conditions of the economic reports in our criminal legislation. If there is
something that could help to refine the available alternatives in public policy adding
realism to proposals, that is the economic and budgetary situation at the time the
policy is drafted. Unfortunately, our legislator does not consider this a fundamental
matter or, most probably, does not have professionals among its staff who are able
to give it the importance that it deserves.18
In the Criminal Code reform that took place in 2010, for example, the economic
report is an easy way to show what happens when a team without economic
expertise drafts such a document. Conclusions like: “This reform is absolutely
neutral in relation to the material resources and personnel of Criminal Courts”,
which are declared without showing any calculations or reference to a budgetary
chapter whatsoever, are simply out of place.19
With regard to the second topic, the information that the Criminal Policy
Division staff should manage, though it is an issue closely connected with the
staff training, I would say there are some important things to mention.
We certainly have a high-level scientific production regarding criminal-law
studies, whether dogmatic or of a comparative nature. However, Spain is failing
on two fronts: first, in studies of an empirical nature about the Spanish Criminal
Policy reality and, second, in the incorporation of information from non-legal
sources to the decision-making process, among which I would highlight once
again the contributions of Criminology.
Despite all this, there are already enough studies and sources of data of such
nature for the Division to be able to carry out an important work of compilation,
In an opposite way, see Brandariz Garcı´a (2014, p. 115), who argues that “the new Criminal
Policy purpose is the efficient management of criminality, seeking the—most economically
possible—minimization of its effects”. In my opinion, the author reflects in this argument the
situation in societies that are not the Spanish. I think we could still benefit from an actuarial
approach in a Criminal Policy drafted intuitively by people without expert knowledge. His
argument warns, however, of the excesses of this perspective which, I insist, is still far from
being a danger to the Spanish situation.
And all of this in an economic impact report of two pages in a reform that affects roughly 25 %
of the existing Criminal Code. In the same sense, see Rodrı´guez Ferra´ndez (2013), p. 32. This
author offers an interesting and careful analysis of the different reports that were annexed to the
bill that was finally passed in Jun 22nd 2010.
5 Institutional Redesign Proposals for the Preparation of Criminal Policy by. . .
processing and interpretation to provide assessment to the Government from scientific standards that up until now have rarely been available.20
In addition, the Division could work with the reports and documentation that is
already periodically produced by different institutions, such as the National Prosecution Service, the Judiciary, the Office of National Statistics in their legal reports,
the statistics on crime rates from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the information
regarding prison population from the different authorities that manage the prison
system in Spain, etc. (Garcı´a Espa~na and Pe´rez Jime´nez 2004, p. 13 ff.).21
Together with this, the Division itself could promote the delivery of annual
reports and periodic studies by sponsoring all or part of it, it could also request
information from the corresponding authorities or fostering the study and analysis
of information on Criminal Policy matters, as well as the systematic collection of
We should not forget that, as it happened when studying the definition of the
problem, we face fundamental aspects for more rational decision-making in the
preparation of alternatives. The steps taken in this area will determine deeply the
final features of the policy.
Actors in the Pre-legislative Phase: The Creation of a
Network Coordinated by the Ministry of Justice
Up until this point, I have discussed the potential of this Criminal Policy Division at
very early moments in the drafting of Criminal Policy measures. There is no doubt
that, from the beginning of the process, the Ministry of Justice will be subject to the
most diverse collective and individual pressures so that the decisions consider
specific interests. This is the reason why another field in which my proposal seeks
to ease the task of our authorities is related to the management of such pressures.
From an early moment, the Ministry of Justice must start to coordinate two
activities: decisions relating to the problem and decisions relating to the actors
around the problem. Political entities usually face both scenarios simultaneously,
foreseeing the reaction of individuals and groups of relevance to the decision maker
at each step of the public policy. I suggest reorganizing the situation, not calling for
a radical turn in the reality of what currently happens, but proposing certain
As Redondo Illescas and Garrido Genove´s (2013, p. 126) assert, “nowadays there is a lot of
criminological knowledge that could have practical implications, but such knowledge is very
scarcely used (. . .) in the preparation of criminal reforms”.
For an overview of information sources for the study of criminality, see Redondo Illescas and
Garrido Genove´s (2013), p. 179 ff.
For example, sponsoring particular or periodic projects, or promoting agreements with
adjustments and standards that, I think, could positively affect the activities that are
usually carried out.
Although the previous problem-definition phase will normally be marked by
swift action and the Criminal Policy Division will have to respond rapidly by using
its own resources, once the minister decides to take action and study the existing
alternatives, we enter a phase in which, in my opinion, the Division should change
its approach, from a work predominantly oriented towards the inside of the Ministry
of Justice, to act as an authentic facilitator of public policies of a criminal nature.
So, we find ourselves at a point at which the decision to create a new policy has
been taken or, more probably, to reform an existing one. The real creative work
starts, therefore, which steps will determine the impact of the policy on society.23
It is essential to organise the Division as a liaison body inside a much broader,
diverse and complex organisational structure than the one usually considered when
drafting policies. The common reference to only a few agents as those responsible
for all Criminal Policy governmental measures is built on the fiction that criminal
legislation, as a central, federal or state power, does not involve any other level of the
Administration in our country. According to this weberian or legal-rationalist vision
of public policies, Government would monopolize the capability to innovate and to
prepare every command and, as a consequence of the hierarchy of the system, every
precept contained in such command would be accurately followed (Weber
et al. 1946, p. 51). In such an ideal model, the policy decided by the Ministry as
the dominant executive body is applied in the same way across the territory and the
system itself as well as the individuals that participate in it are not considered
variables to be taken into account. This is known as a top-down model from the
perspective of policy implementation (Birkland 2001, p. 179; Bla´zquez Vilaplana
and Morata Garcı´a de la Puerta 2005, p. 156; Becerra Mu~noz 2013, p. 314 ff.).
Organizational as well as public administration studies agree on the limitations
of any analysis that does not take into consideration the difficulties that public
policies face during implementation stages.24 Although possible courses of action
are still being thought through and implementation is a long way off, the need to
anticipate future difficulties is essential for the correct development of the policy.
The case of Criminal Policy in our country is paradigmatic in this sense, as it is
created by authorities which will not have the power to implement it. Such situation
is a failing in the theoretical weberian command structure that should not be
overlooked. From this perspective the risk lies in the possibility that the variety
of bodies and individuals that manage the policy add their own rationality to it,
increasing the gap between the actual implementation of the policy and the
Let us remember that, as public policy analysis literature claims, the decision of doing nothing
should be an alternative taken into account, either because the situation is not serious enough for
Criminal Policy measures, or because other forms of intervention outside of the criminal context
might alleviate the problem sufficiently, etc. (see Mondrago´n Ruiz de Lezana 2005, p. 134).
Criticising an exclusively top-down approach, see Birkland (2001), p. 181 and Meny and
Thoenig (1992), p. 161.