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3 Zooming Out from Higher Education: Can the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory Travel to Other Policy Fields?

3 Zooming Out from Higher Education: Can the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory Travel to Other Policy Fields?

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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK



311



other (social) policy fields. To test this, future research could apply the

proposed theoretical model to the study of (seemingly well-understood)

policy areas such as healthcare policies, pension policies, unemployment

benefits, (active) labor market policies, early childhood education and care

policies, leave policies, or privatization policies in more general terms—to

name but a few examples.

Naturally, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory has several scope conditions (such as the existence of a functioning democratic party government and the existence of differing party positions). Nonetheless, I believe

that the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory could apply well to other fields,

as many other (social) policy areas show a similar historical development

to higher education policies. Often, the countries’ systems and policies

looked very similar in the 1940s and 1950s and diverged in different

directions only afterwards. For example, Rothstein (1998) and Iversen

(2005: 15) (among others) noted this in regards to social spending,

Immergut (1992) showed that this holds for healthcare systems, and

Busemeyer (2015) for secondary—and partly vocational—education systems. Policy-makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s often found highly

similar circumstances and developed the systems in very different directions during the 1950s–1980s.

Moreover, it is a crucial finding of the historical institutionalist literature that path dependencies have become increasingly prevalent in the

more recent phase and the effects of parties (and other politico-economic

actors) have become increasingly difficult to detect in many policy areas.

The historical institutionalist literature points at positive feedback-effects/

increasing returns to explain these. However, in turn, historical institutionalists have often downplayed the role of politico-economic actors,

particularly of political parties in shaping the policies that set countries on

the respective paths in the first place. In this regard, scholars in a rational

choice tradition have developed stronger accounts. The strength of the

Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory is that it brings the arguments and findings from both the rational choice perspective and the historical institutionalist perspective together and combines them into a single model that

can help make sense of policy-making processes over time.

In summary, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory developed here to

explain the historical origins and the recent sustainability of the Four

Worlds of Student Finance is a promising perspective that could equally

also be applied to explain policy-making processes in other policy

domains.



312



J.L. GARRITZMANN



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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK



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INDEX



A

agenda, 7, 114, 121, 131, 143,

172, 173, 224

Aho, Matti L., 108, 109

Allies/Allied forces, 116, 118–19,

120, 121, 137

asumislisä, 105



B

BAföG/Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz, 39, 93n9, 133, 143,

145–54, 155, 159, 196n12

Baumol (cost disease argument),

9, 10

Blair, Tony, 193, 194

Bologna/Bologna process, 12



C

Clinton, Bill, 185–7

cluster analysis, 57, 78–91, 93n11,

93n13, 95n25



CMP (Comparative Manifestos

Project), 210, 231

coordinated market economy, 30,

103



D

debt aversion, 1, 21, 72, 189, 273

decentralization, 119, 120, 232



E

electoral system, 13, 14, 101, 103

employer(s), 119

employment/unemployment, 110, 126,

165, 168, 170, 252, 281, 284, 311

enrollment, 2, 11, 17–22, 26, 28, 33,

37–41, 46, 92n4, 100, 102, 104,

106–8, 112–14, 116–24, 126–32,

136–40, 142, 147, 159–65,

170–2, 174, 179, 181, 188–90,

195n6, 196n7, 196n9, 210, 216,

227–30, 270, 273, 277, 301, 305



© The Author(s) 2016

J.L. Garritzmann, The Political Economy of Higher Education

Finance, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29913-6



315



316



INDEX



error-correction model, 250, 253,

261, 265n7

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 60

expert survey(s), 5, 42, 211–13, 224,

231, 306



globalization, 7, 8, 15, 252

governance/Higher education

governance, 9, 45n5, 68, 85,

115, 210

grants/student grants, 1, 2, 20, 36,

38, 69, 72–7, 78, 84, 86, 89, 90,

93n8, 95n25, 105, 108–11, 125,

130, 132, 134, 138, 145, 147,

148, 151, 159, 162, 163, 165,

170, 171, 173–88, 190, 193,

228–30, 243, 248, 252, 253,

276, 289



F

federalism/federalist, 11, 156

feedback effect(s), 24, 99, 182, 186–8,

219–22, 227–32, 275–7

negative feedback effect(s), 29, 178,

276, 279, 291

positive feedback effect(s), 4–6, 25,

26, 28–30, 32, 33, 35–7, 41–3,

106, 109, 111, 112 134, 153,

154, 157–60, 162, 169, 171,

174, 177–9, 181, 188, 192–4,

209–11, 221–3, 237–9, 241,

249, 253, 257, 261, 262,

267–94, 303–5, 308, 310, 311

financial crisis, 124, 187, 188

Finland, 1, 5, 8, 23, 26, 42, 60, 74,

76, 84, 89–92, 94n20, 95n25,

103, 104–13, 115, 136, 138,

141, 147, 159, 160, 191, 195n6,

220, 237, 304

fiscal austerity, 8, 10, 106, 114,

129, 302

further education, 7, 210, 228



I

inequality, 7, 38, 41, 126, 132, 181,

189, 224, 233n4, 270, 302,

309

International Social Survey

Programme (ISSP), 43, 268–9,

270, 277, 280, 281, 284,

292

issue emphasis, 209, 213, 214,

223–6, 233n5



G

Germany, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 23, 25, 27,

39, 42, 60, 61, 65, 68, 70, 78,

92, 93n9, 99, 103, 108, 109,

113, 118, 133–60, 165, 190–2,

195n6, 195n7, 196n9, 250,

304, 305

G.I. Bill, 26, 138, 165, 168–75, 192,

197n15

gender, 277, 284



J

Japan, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 18, 23, 26,

42, 65, 68, 69, 74, 76, 78, 83,

89, 92, 93n12, 99, 103–4,

108, 109, 113–32, 134,

136, 137, 190, 191, 195n6,

237, 240, 245, 248, 279,

304, 308

Johnson, Lyndon B., 173, 174, 187,

197n17



H

high school(s), 39, 40, 119, 121

historical institutionalism, 6, 59,

308



INDEX



K

Kennedy, John F., 173

Kohl, Helmut, 25, 134, 135, 151–4,

155, 159



L

Land/Länder, 146

liberal market economy, 103

loans/student loans, 1, 2, 20, 36, 58,

69, 72, 74–7, 84, 86, 89, 90,

93n8, 105, 108–11, 115, 130,

132–4, 140, 141, 148, 151, 155,

159, 160, 162, 168, 170, 173–6,

180–8, 193, 196n10, 212, 229,

243, 248, 252, 253, 289



M

majoritarian voting system, 13, 14, 103

manifesto(s)/party manifestos, 5, 42,

111, 228–30

Merkel, Angela, 159

multi-level model, 43, 269,

278, 289

multi-method design, 5, 6, 301, 304,

308



N

Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 129–30, 131

New Deal, 168

norms, 31, 274



O

Obama, Barack, 160, 186–8

opintotuki, 105, 109, 195n4

opposition(s), 25, 43, 106, 116,

140, 143, 145, 150, 151, 158,

174, 175, 186, 187, 228–30,

273, 290

opposition power, 186



317



P

partisan theory/hypothesis, 3–6, 14–27,

36–7, 100, 110, 209, 237–65

party/parties

agrarians/agrarian parties, 106, 109,

216, 225

Christian democrat(s)/Christian

democratic parties, 16, 17, 21,

25, 133, 134, 137, 138, 144,

159, 192, 215–17, 219–21,

231, 249, 252, 261, 305, 306

conservatives/conservative parties,

3, 12, 16, 21, 43, 70, 74, 103,

108–11, 113–16, 119–21, 122,

123, 126, 128, 129–32, 135,

137–45, 148, 150–2, 155, 157,

159, 168–9, 171, 173, 176,

181, 185, 191, 193, 194,

196n9, 216, 217, 219–21, 227,

229–30, 231, 240, 241, 244–9,

252, 253, 261, 280, 304, 306

greens/green party, 107, 154,

216, 217, 219, 221, 225,

226, 231, 306

liberals/liberal parties, 12, 16, 17,

21, 70, 103, 113–14, 121–9,

134, 138, 142, 193, 215,

216–21, 227–31, 305, 306, 308

nationalists/nationalistic parties,

216, 225

regionalalists/regional parties, 225

social democrat(s)/social democratic

parties, 15, 16, 25, 70, 106,

107–9, 116, 134, 137, 144–6,

150, 171, 215–17, 219, 221,

225, 227, 231, 249, 252, 261,

306

socialists/socialist parties, 107, 216,

217, 219, 221, 224, 231, 252,

261, 306

path dependencies, 4, 24, 28, 29,

45n7, 119, 121, 262, 292,

308, 311



318



INDEX



Pierson, Paul, 23–4, 28–9, 31,

46n11, 276

pre-primary education, 7, 210

primary education, 119, 210

proportional representation,

13, 14, 103

public debt, 15, 150, 182, 252, 253

public opinion, 6, 28, 29, 30, 32–4,

102, 110, 153, 154, 157, 158,

169, 170, 182, 197n15, 276,

307, 308



skills, 6–7, 9, 19, 90, 120, 144, 210,

217, 274, 292, 308

social investment, 7

social policy/social policies, 44n2,

151, 160, 217, 272, 275, 278,

309–11

socio-economic strata (SES), 20–2, 38,

40, 72, 147, 155, 164, 170–1,

174, 183, 189, 190, 215, 228,

301, 302

stratification, 142



Q

quality (of higher education), 21, 22,

25, 120, 126, 162, 181, 216,

227, 229, 303



T

tax/taxes/taxation, 13, 16, 20, 21,

31, 33, 36, 92, 105, 115, 144,

148, 150–2, 155, 162, 176,

180–8, 194, 224, 233n4, 273,

275, 277, 279, 281

time-series–cross-section regressions,

5, 13, 14, 43, 238, 239, 249–61,

306, 307

time-sensitive partisan theory, 4–6,

23–7, 35, 37, 42–4, 59, 99, 110,

112, 121, 133, 154, 157, 158,

160, 189–90, 192–5, 196n9,

227, 230, 237–65, 267, 268,

285, 289, 292, 301, 303–8,

310–11

trade-off(s)/policy trade-off(s),

278, 279, 309

type of capitalism

coordinated market economy,

30, 103

liberal market economy, 103



R

rational choice, 5, 6, 28, 30, 31, 32,

268, 270, 276, 308, 311

Reagan, Ronald, 38, 151, 177, 180,

181–4, 188

redistribution, 7, 15, 16, 20, 41,

45n7, 182, 269, 270, 275, 278,

284–6, 292, 307

risk aversion, 21, 189, 273

Roosevelt, Frank D., 168–72



S

saliency theory/saliency theoretical,

111, 225

Saukkonen, Jussi, 108

Schröder, Gerhard, 135, 146,

154–6, 159

secondary education, 13, 119, 144,

154, 210, 309

self-interest, 269, 272–4, 280–6,

292, 307

service economy, 9, 66



U

union(s)/labor unions, 105, 139

United Kingdom/UK, 2, 60,

61, 66, 68, 76, 83, 89, 192,

219, 249



INDEX



United States of America/USA, 1–3,

5, 9, 10, 12, 15, 23, 26, 27, 30,

38, 42, 44–5n5, 68, 77, 83, 84,

89, 92, 99, 103, 104, 113, 116,

118, 136, 138, 160–89, 191,

195n6, 197n18, 213, 237, 238,

249, 304, 305



V

Virolainen, Johannes, 109

vocational education and training

(VET), 7, 30, 145, 271, 274, 309



319



W

wage(s), 10, 20, 41, 126, 141, 224,

226, 231

welfare, 66, 160, 184, 185, 249, 252

welfare states/welfare regimes, 6, 7,

12, 13, 70, 74, 79, 90, 103, 141,

211, 214–15, 231, 239, 261,

280, 310



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