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5 Implications of the Prisoners’ Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing

5 Implications of the Prisoners’ Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing

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CHAPTER 12 • Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 473



the “correct” price is $10, while Firm B thinks it is $9. When it sets a $9 price,

Firm A might view this as an attempt to undercut and retaliate by lowering its

price to $8. The result is a price war.

In many industries, therefore, implicit collusion is short lived. There is often a

fundamental layer of mistrust, so warfare erupts as soon as one firm is perceived

by its competitors to be “rocking the boat” by changing its price or increasing

advertising.



Price Rigidity

Because implicit collusion tends to be fragile, oligopolistic firms often have a

strong desire for price stability. This is why price rigidity can be a characteristic

of oligopolistic industries. Even if costs or demand change, firms are reluctant to

change price. If costs fall or market demand declines, they fear that lower prices

might send the wrong message to their competitors and set off a price war. And

if costs or demand rises, they are reluctant to raise prices because they are afraid

that their competitors may not raise theirs.

Price rigidity is the basis of the kinked demand curve model of oligopoly.

According to this model, each firm faces a demand curve kinked at the currently

prevailing price P*. (See Figure 12.7.) At prices above P*, the demand curve is

very elastic. The reason is that the firm believes that if it raises its price above

P*, other firms will not follow suit, and it will therefore lose sales and much of

its market share. On the other hand, the firm believes that if it lowers its price

below P*, other firms will follow suit because they will not want to lose their

shares of the market. In that case, sales will expand only to the extent that a

lower market price increases total market demand.

Because the firm’s demand curve is kinked, its marginal revenue curve is

discontinuous. (The bottom part of the marginal revenue curve corresponds to

the less elastic part of the demand curve, as shown by the solid portions of each

curve.) As a result, the firm’s costs can change without resulting in a change in



• price rigidity Characteristic

of oligopolistic markets by which

firms are reluctant to change

prices even if costs or demands

change.



• kinked demand curve

model Oligopoly model in

which each firm faces a demand

curve kinked at the currently

prevailing price: at higher prices

demand is very elastic, whereas

at lower prices it is inelastic.



$/Q



F IGURE 12.7



THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE

MC′



P*



MC



D



Q*



Quantity

MR



Each firm believes that if it raises its price above

the current price P*, none of its competitors will

follow suit, so it will lose most of its sales. Each firm

also believes that if it lowers price, everyone will

follow suit, and its sales will increase only to the

extent that market demand increases. As a result,

the firm’s demand curve D is kinked at price P*,

and its marginal revenue curve MR is discontinuous at that point. If marginal cost increases from

MC to MC’, the firm will still produce the same

output level Q* and charge the same price P*.



474 PART 3 • Market Structure and Competitive Strategy

price. As shown in Figure 12.7, marginal cost could increase but still equal marginal revenue at the same output level, so that price stays the same.

Although the kinked demand curve model is attractively simple, it does not

really explain oligopolistic pricing. It says nothing about how firms arrived at

price P* in the first place, and why they didn’t arrive at some different price. It is

useful mainly as a description of price rigidity rather than as an explanation of it.

The explanation for price rigidity comes from the prisoners’ dilemma and from

firms’ desires to avoid mutually destructive price competition.



Price Signaling and Price Leadership



• price signaling Form of

implicit collusion in which a firm

announces a price increase in the

hope that other firms will follow

suit.



• price leadership Pattern

of pricing in which one firm

regularly announces price

changes that other firms then

match.



A big impediment to implicitly collusive pricing is the fact that it is difficult

for firms to agree (without talking to each other) on what the price should be.

Coordination is particularly difficult when cost and demand conditions—and

thus the “correct” price—are changing. Price signaling is a form of implicit

collusion that sometimes gets around this problem. For example, a firm might

announce that it has raised its price (perhaps through a press release) and hope

that its competitors will take this announcement as a signal that they should also

raise prices. If competitors follow suit, all of the firms will earn higher profits.

Sometimes a pattern is established whereby one firm regularly announces

price changes and other firms in the industry follow suit. This pattern is called

price leadership: One firm is implicitly recognized as the “leader,” while the

other firms, the “price followers,” match its prices. This behavior solves the

problem of coordinating price: Everyone charges what the leader is charging.

Suppose, for example, that three oligopolistic firms are currently charging $10

for their product. (If they all know the market demand curve, this might be the

Nash equilibrium price.) Suppose that by colluding, they could all set a price of

$20 and greatly increase their profits. Meeting and agreeing to set a price of $20

is illegal. But suppose instead that Firm A raises its price to $15, and announces

to the business press that it is doing so because higher prices are needed to

restore economic vitality to the industry. Firms B and C might view this as a clear

message—namely, that Firm A is seeking their cooperation in raising prices. They

might then raise their own prices to $15. Firm A might then increase price further—say, to $18—and Firms B and C might raise their prices as well. Whether

or not the profit-maximizing price of $20 is reached (or surpassed), a pattern of

coordination has been established that, from the firm’s point of view, may be

nearly as effective as meeting and formally agreeing on a price.10

This example of signaling and price leadership is extreme and might lead to an

antitrust lawsuit. But in some industries, a large firm might naturally emerge as a

leader, with the other firms deciding that they are best off just matching the leader’s

prices, rather than trying to undercut the leader or each other. An example is the U.S.

automobile industry, where General Motors has traditionally been the price leader.

Price leadership can also serve as a way for oligopolistic firms to deal with

the reluctance to change prices, a reluctance that arises out of the fear of being

undercut or “rocking the boat.” As cost and demand conditions change, firms

may find it increasingly necessary to change prices that have remained rigid for

some time. In that case, they might look to a price leader to signal when and

by how much price should change. Sometimes a large firm will naturally act

as leader; sometimes different firms will act as leader from time to time. The

example that follows illustrates this.

10



For a formal model of how such price leadership can facilitate collusion, see Julio J. Rotemberg and

Garth Saloner, “Collusive Price Leadership,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 1990; 93–111.



CHAPTER 12 • Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 475



EX AMPLE 12. 4 PRICE LEADERSHIP AND PRICE RIGIDITY IN COMMERCIAL

BANKING

Commercial banks borrow money from individuals and companies who deposit funds in checking accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of

deposit. They then use this money to make loans to

household and corporate borrowers. By lending at

an interest rate higher than the rate that they pay on

their deposits, they earn a profit.

The largest commercial banks in the United

States compete with each other to make loans to

large corporate clients. The main form of competition is over price—in this case, the interest rates

they charge. If competition becomes aggressive,

the interest rates fall, and so do profits. The incentive to avoid aggressive competition leads to price

rigidity, and to a form of price leadership.

The interest rate that banks charge large corporate

clients is called the prime rate. Because it is widely

known, it is a convenient focal point for price leadership.



Most large banks charge the same or nearly the same

prime rate; they avoid making frequent changes in the

rate that might be destabilizing and lead to competitive warfare. The prime rate changes only when

money market conditions cause other interest rates to

rise or fall substantially. When that happens, one of the

major banks announces a change in its rate and other

banks quickly follow suit. Different banks act as leader

from time to time, but when one bank announces a

change, the others follow within two or three days.

Figure 12.8 compares the prime rate with the

interest rate on high-grade (AAA) corporate bonds.

Observe that although the corporate bond rate fluctuated continuously, there were extended periods

during which the prime rate did the change. This is

an example of price rigidity—banks are reluctant to

change their lending rate for fear of being undercut

and losing business to their competitors.



10



9



Prime Rate



Percent per Year



8



7



6

AAA Corporate Bond Yield

5



4



3

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011



F IGURE 12.8



PRIME RATE VERSUS CORPORATE BOND RATE

The prime rate is the rate that major banks charge large corporate customers for short-term loans. It changes

only infrequently because banks are reluctant to undercut one another. When a change does occur, it begins

with one bank, and other banks quickly follow suit. The corporate bond rate is the return on long-term corporate

bonds. Because these bonds are widely traded, this rate fluctuates with market conditions.



476 PART 3 • Market Structure and Competitive Strategy



E XA MPLE 12.5



THE PRICES OF COLLEGE TEXTBOOKS



If you bought this book new at a college bookstore in the United States,

you probably paid something close

to $200 for it. Now, there’s no doubt

about it—this is a fantastic book! But

$200? Why so much?11

A quick visit to the bookstore will

prove that the price of this book is not

at all unusual. Most textbooks sold in

the United States have retail prices

in the $200 range. In fact even other

microeconomics textbooks—which

are clearly inferior to this one—sell

for around $200. Publishing companies set the prices of their textbooks, so should

we expect competition among publishers to drive

down prices?

Partly because of mergers and acquisitions over

the last decade or so, college textbook publishing is an oligopoly. (Pearson, the publisher of this

book, is the largest college textbook publisher,

followed by Cengage Learning and McGraw-Hill.)



These publishers have an incentive

to avoid a price war that could drive

prices down. The best way to avoid a

price war is to avoid discounting and

to increase prices in lockstep on a

regular basis.

The retail bookstore industry is

also highly concentrated, and the

retail markup on textbooks is around

30 percent. Thus a $200 retail price

implies that the publisher is receiving a net (wholesale) price of about

$150. The elasticity of demand is low,

because the instructor chooses the

textbook, often disregarding the price. On the other

hand, if the price is too high, some students will buy

a used book or decide not to buy the book at all.

In fact, it might be the case that publishers could

earn more money by lowering textbook prices. So

why don’t they do that? First, that might lead to a

dreaded price war. Second, publishers might not

have read this book!



The Dominant Firm Model

• dominant firm Firm with a

large share of total sales that sets

price to maximize profits, taking

into account the supply response

of smaller firms.



In some oligopolistic markets, one large firm has a major share of total sales

while a group of smaller firms supplies the remainder of the market. The large

firm might then act as a dominant firm, setting a price that maximizes its

own profits. The other firms, which individually could have little influence

over price, would then act as perfect competitors: They take the price set by

the dominant firm as given and produce accordingly. But what price should

the dominant firm set? To maximize profit, it must take into account how the

output of the other firms depends on the price it sets.

Figure 12.9 shows how a dominant firm sets its price. Here, D is the market demand curve, and SF is the supply curve (i.e., the aggregate marginal

cost curve) of the smaller fringe firms. The dominant firm must determine its

demand curve DD. As the figure shows, this curve is just the difference between

market demand and the supply of fringe firms. For example, at price P1, the

supply of fringe firms is just equal to market demand; thus the dominant firm

can sell nothing at this price. At a price P2 or less, fringe firms will not supply

any of the good, so the dominant firm faces the market demand curve. At prices

between P1 and P2, the dominant firm faces the demand curve DD.

11



You might have saved some money by buying the book via the Internet. If you bought the book

used, or if you rented an electronic edition, you probably paid about half the U.S. retail price. And if

you bought the International Student Edition of the book, which is paperback and only sold outside

the U.S., you probably paid much less. For an updated list of the prices of intermediate microeconomics textbooks, go to http://theory.economics.utoronto.ca/poet/.



CHAPTER 12 • Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 477



Price



D

SF



F IGURE 12.9



P1



PRICE SETTING BY A DOMINANT FIRM

MCD



The dominant firm sets price, and the other firms

sell all they want at that price. The dominant firm’s

demand curve, DD, is the difference between

market demand D and the supply of fringe firms

SF . The dominant firm produces a quantity QD

at the point where its marginal revenue MRD is

equal to its marginal cost MCD. The corresponding price is P*. At this price, fringe firms sell QF,

so that total sales equal QT.



P*

DD



P2



QF



QD



QT



Quantity

MRD



Corresponding to DD is the dominant firm’s marginal revenue curve MRD.

MCD is the dominant firm’s marginal cost curve. To maximize its profit, the

dominant firm produces quantity QD at the intersection of MRD and MCD. From

the demand curve DD, we find price P*. At this price, fringe firms sell a quantity

QF; thus the total quantity sold is QT = QD + QF .



12.6 Cartels

Producers in a cartel explicitly agree to cooperate in setting prices and output

levels. Not all the producers in an industry need to join the cartel, and most

cartels involve only a subset of producers. But if enough producers adhere to

the cartel’s agreements, and if market demand is sufficiently inelastic, the cartel

may drive prices well above competitive levels.

Cartels are often international. While U.S. antitrust laws prohibit American

companies from colluding, those of other countries are much weaker and are

sometimes poorly enforced. Furthermore, nothing prevents countries, or companies owned or controlled by foreign governments, from forming cartels. For

example, the OPEC cartel is an international agreement among oil-producing

countries which has succeeded in raising world oil prices above competitive

levels.

Other international cartels have also succeeded in raising prices. During the

mid-1970s, for example, the International Bauxite Association (IBA) quadrupled

bauxite prices, and a secretive international uranium cartel pushed up uranium

prices. Some cartels had longer successes: From 1928 through the early 1970s,



478 PART 3 • Market Structure and Competitive Strategy

a cartel called Mercurio Europeo kept the price of mercury close to monopoly

levels, and an international cartel monopolized the iodine market from 1878

through 1939. However, most cartels have failed to raise prices. An international

copper cartel operates to this day, but it has never had a significant impact on copper prices. Cartel attempts to drive up the prices of tin, coffee, tea, and cocoa have

also failed.12



Recall from §10.2 that

monopoly power refers to

market power on the part of

a seller—the ability of a firm

to price its product above its

marginal cost of production.



CONDITIONS FOR CARTEL SUCCESS Why do some cartels succeed while

others fail? There are two conditions for cartel success. First, a stable cartel

organization must be formed whose members agree on price and production

levels and then adhere to that agreement. Unlike our prisoners in the prisoners’ dilemma, cartel members can talk to each other to formalize an agreement.

This does not mean, however, that agreeing is easy. Different members may

have different costs, different assessments of market demand, and even different objectives, and they may therefore want to set price at different levels.

Furthermore, each member of the cartel will be tempted to “cheat” by lowering

its price slightly to capture a larger market share than it was allotted. Most often,

only the threat of a long-term return to competitive prices deters cheating of this

sort. But if the profits from cartelization are large enough, that threat may be

sufficient.

The second condition is the potential for monopoly power. Even if a cartel

can solve its organizational problems, there will be little room to raise price if

it faces a highly elastic demand curve. Potential monopoly power may be the

most important condition for success; if the potential gains from cooperation

are large, cartel members will have more incentive to solve their organizational

problems.



Analysis of Cartel Pricing

Only rarely do all the producers of a good combine to form a cartel. A cartel

usually accounts for only a portion of total production and must take into

account the supply response of competitive (noncartel) producers when it sets

price. Cartel pricing can thus be analyzed by using the dominant firm model

discussed earlier. We will apply this model to two cartels, the OPEC oil cartel

and the CIPEC copper cartel.13 This will help us understand why OPEC was successful in raising price while CIPEC was not.

ANALYZING OPEC Figure 12.10 illustrates the case of OPEC. Total demand

TD is the total world demand curve for crude oil, and Sc is the competitive

(non-OPEC) supply curve. The demand for OPEC oil DOPEC is the difference

between total demand and competitive supply, and MROPEC is the corresponding

marginal revenue curve. MCOPEC is OPEC’s marginal cost curve; as you can see,

OPEC has much lower production costs than do non-OPEC producers. OPEC’s

marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal at quantity QOPEC, which is the

quantity that OPEC will produce. We see from OPEC’s demand curve that the

price will be P*, at which competitive supply is Qc.

Suppose petroleum-exporting countries had not formed a cartel but had

instead produced competitively. Price would then have equaled marginal cost.

We can therefore determine the competitive price from the point where OPEC’s

12

See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Robert S. Pindyck, “Cartel Theory and Cartel Experience in

International Minerals Markets,” in Energy: Markets and Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).

13



CIPEC is the French acronym for International Council of Copper Exporting Countries.



CHAPTER 12 • Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 479



TD



Price



Sc



F IGURE 12.10



THE OPEC OIL CARTEL



P*

DOPEC



MC OPEC



Pc′



TD is the total world demand curve for oil, and Sc is

the competitive (non-OPEC) supply curve. OPEC’s

demand DOPEC is the difference between the two.

Because both total demand and competitive supply are inelastic, OPEC’s demand is inelastic. OPEC’s

profit-maximizing quantity QOPEC is found at the intersection of its marginal revenue and marginal cost

curves; at this quantity, OPEC charges price P*. If

OPEC producers had not cartelized, price would be

Pc, where OPEC’s demand and marginal cost curves

intersect.



MR OPEC

Qc



QOPEC



QT



Quantity



demand curve intersects its marginal cost curve. That price, labeled Pc, is much

lower than the cartel price P*. Because both total demand and non-OPEC supply are inelastic, the demand for OPEC oil is also fairly inelastic. Thus the cartel

has substantial monopoly power, and it has used that power to drive prices well

above competitive levels.

In Chapter 2, we stressed the importance of distinguishing between short-run

and long-run supply and demand. That distinction is important here. The total

demand and non-OPEC supply curves in Figure 12.10 apply to a short- or intermediate-run analysis. In the long run, both demand and supply will be much

more elastic, which means that OPEC’s demand curve will also be much more

elastic. We would thus expect that in the long run OPEC would be unable to

maintain a price that is so much above the competitive level. Indeed, during

1982–1989, oil prices fell in real terms, largely because of the long-run adjustment of demand and non-OPEC supply.

ANALYZING CIPEC Figure 12.11 provides a similar analysis of CIPEC,

which consists of four copper-producing countries: Chile, Peru, Zambia,

and Congo (formerly Zaire), that collectively account for less than half of

world copper production. In these countries, production costs are lower

than those of non-CIPEC producers, but except for Chile, not much lower. In

Figure 12.11, CIPEC’s marginal cost curve is therefore drawn only a little

below the non-CIPEC supply curve. CIPEC’s demand curve DCIPEC is the difference between total demand TD and non-CIPEC supply Sc. CIPEC’s marginal

cost and marginal revenue curves intersect at quantity QCIPEC, with the corresponding price P*. Again, the competitive price Pc is found at the point where

CIPEC’s demand curve intersects its marginal cost curve. Note that this price

is very close to the cartel price P*.

Why can’t CIPEC increase copper prices much? As Figure 12.11 shows, the

total demand for copper is more elastic than that for oil. (Other materials, such



480 PART 3 • Market Structure and Competitive Strategy



Price



TD



F IGURE 12.11



THE CIPEC COPPER CARTEL



Sc



TD is the total demand for copper and Sc is the

competitive (non-CIPEC) supply. CIPEC’s demand DCIPEC is the difference between the two.

Both total demand and competitive supply are

relatively elastic, so CIPEC’s demand curve is

elastic, and CIPEC has very little monopoly

power. Note that CIPEC’s optimal price P* is

close to the competitive price Pc.



MCCIPEC

P*

Pc



DCIPEC



MR CIPEC



Q CIPEC Qc



QT



Quantity



as aluminum, can easily be substituted for copper.) Also, competitive supply is

much more elastic. Even in the short run, non-CIPEC producers can easily

expand supply if prices should rise (in part because of the availability of supply

from scrap metal). Thus CIPEC’s potential monopoly power is small.

As the examples of OPEC and CIPEC illustrate, successful cartelization requires

two things. First, the total demand for the good must not be very price elastic.

Second, either the cartel must control nearly all the world’s supply or, if it does

not, the supply of noncartel producers must not be price elastic. Most international

commodity cartels have failed because few world markets meet both conditions.



E XA MPLE 12.6 THE CARTELIZATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

Many people think of intercollegiate athletics as an extracurricular

activity for college students and a

diversion for fans. They assume

that universities support athletics

because it not only gives amateur

athletes a chance to develop their

skills and play football or basketball before large audiences but

also provides entertainment and promotes school

spirit and alumni support. Although it does these

things, intercollegiate athletics is also a big—and an

extremely profitable—industry.

Like any industry, intercollegiate athletics has

firms and consumers. The “firms” are the universities



that support and finance teams.

The inputs to production are the

coaches, student athletes, and

capital in the form of stadiums

and playing fields. The consumers,

many of whom are current or

former college students, are the

fans who buy tickets to games

and the TV and radio networks

that pay to broadcast them. There are many firms

and consumers, which suggests that the industry is

competitive. But the persistently high level of profits

in this industry is inconsistent with competition—a

large state university can regularly earn more than

$6 million a year in profits from football games



CHAPTER 12 • Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 481



alone.14 This profitability is the result of monopoly

power, obtained via cartelization.

The cartel organization is the National Collegiate

Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA restricts

competition in a number of important ways. To reduce

bargaining power by student athletes, the NCAA

creates and enforces rules regarding eligibility and

terms of compensation. To reduce competition by universities, it limits the number of games that can be

played each season and the number of teams that can

participate in each division. And to limit price competition, the NCAA positioned itself as the sole negotiator of all football television contracts, thereby monopolizing one of the main sources of industry revenues.

The NCAA was forced to end this practice in 1984.

Has the NCAA been a successful cartel? Like most

cartels, its members have occasionally broken its

rules and regulations. But until 1984, it was successful in increasing the monopoly power of the college

basketball industry well above what it would have

been otherwise. In 1984, however, the Supreme

Court ruled that the NCAA’s monopolization of

football television contracts was illegal, allowing individual universities to negotiate their own contracts.

The ensuing competition led to an increase in the

amount of college football shown on television, but

a drop in the contract fees paid to schools, which has

resulted in a decrease in the total revenues to schools.



All in all, although the Supreme Court’s ruling reduced

the NCAA’s monopoly power, it did not eliminate it.

The NCAA still negotiates fees for other televised collegiate sports; in 2010, CBS and Turner Broadcasting

signed a $10.8 billion deal with the NCAA to cover the

Division I Men’s Basketball Championship for 14 years.

At the same time, the Association continued a 2001

deal with ESPN to allow coverage of 11 nonrevenue

sports (including the Division I Women’s Basketball

Championship, soccer, men’s ice hockey, and the

College World Series). The original deal called for

ESPN to pay the NCAA $200 million over 11 years.

The NCAA’s anticompetitive practices have come

under numerous attacks. In 2005, the National

Invitation Tournament (NIT), a college basketball tournament operated by the Metropolitan Intercollegiate

Basketball Committee, challenged the NCAA’s rule

that effectively forced schools invited to its tournament to boycott the NIT. The NIT claimed that this

practice was anticompetitive and an illegal use of

the NCAA’s powers. The parties ultimately settled

the lawsuit for nearly $60 million. In 2007, the NCAA

was sued by 11,500 Division I football and basketball players claiming that it illegally fixed the price of

an athletic scholarship below the cost of a college

education. According to the players, the NCAA shortchanged them, on average, $2,500 a year because of

its arbitrary limit on scholarships.



EX AMPLE 12. 7 THE MILK CARTEL

The U.S. government has supported the price of milk since the

Great Depression and continues to

do so today. The government, however, scaled back price supports

during the 1990s, and as a result,

wholesale prices of milk have fluctuated more widely. Not surprisingly,

farmers have been complaining.

In response to these complaints, in 1996 the federal

government allowed milk producers in the six New

England states to cartelize. The cartel—called the

Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact—set minimum

wholesale prices for milk, and was exempt from the



14



antitrust laws. The result was that

consumers in New England paid

more for a gallon of milk than consumers elsewhere in the nation.

In 1999, Congress responded

to the lobbying efforts of farmers in other states by attempting to expand the milk cartel.

Legislation was introduced

that would have allowed dairy farmers in New

York, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and

Pennsylvania to join the New England states and

thereby form a cartel covering most of the northeast

United States.15 Not wanting to be left out, dairy



See “In Big-Time College Athletics, the Real Score Is in Dollars,” New York Times, March 1, 1987.



482 PART 3 • Market Structure and Competitive Strategy

farmers in the South also lobbied Congress for higher

milk prices. As a result, the 1999 legislation also authorized 16 southern states, including Texas, Florida, and

Georgia, to create their own regional cartel.

Studies have suggested that the original cartel (covering only the New England states) has caused retail

prices of milk to rise by only a few cents a gallon. Why so

little? The reason is that the New England cartel is surrounded by a fringe of noncartel producers—namely,

dairy farmers in New York, New Jersey, and other

states. Expanding the cartel, however, would have



shrunk the competitive fringe, thereby giving the cartel a greater influence over milk prices.

Recognizing the political headaches and regional

conflict caused by these attempts at cartelization,

Congress ended the Northeast Interstate Dairy

Compact in October 2001. Although proponents of

the Compact attempted to revive the cartel, opposition in Congress has been strong and, as of 2011,

the cartel has not been re-authorized. Nonetheless,

milk production continues to benefit from federal

price supports.



SUMMARY

1. In a monopolistically competitive market, firms compete by selling differentiated products, which are

highly substitutable. New firms can enter or exit easily.

Firms have only a small amount of monopoly power. In

the long run, entry will occur until profits are driven to

zero. Firms then produce with excess capacity (i.e., at

output levels below those that minimize average cost).

2. In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account

for most or all of production. Barriers to entry allow

some firms to earn substantial profits, even over the

long run. Economic decisions involve strategic considerations—each firm must consider how its actions will

affect its rivals, and how they are likely to react.

3. In the Cournot model of oligopoly, firms make their

output decisions at the same time, each taking the

other’s output as fixed. In equilibrium, each firm is

maximizing its profit, given the output of its competitor, so no firm has an incentive to change its output. The firms are therefore in a Nash equilibrium.

Each firm’s profit is higher than it would be under

perfect competition but less than what it would earn

by colluding.

4. In the Stackelberg model, one firm sets its output first.

That firm has a strategic advantage and earns a higher

profit. It knows that it can choose a large output and



5.



6.



7.



8.



9.



that its competitors will have to choose smaller outputs if they want to maximize profits.

The Nash equilibrium concept can also be applied to

markets in which firms produce substitute goods and

compete by setting price. In equilibrium, each firm

maximizes its profit, given the prices of its competitors, and so has no incentive to change price.

Firms would earn higher profits by collusively agreeing

to raise prices, but the antitrust laws usually prohibit

this. They might all set high prices without colluding,

each hoping its competitors will do the same, but they

are in a prisoners’ dilemma, which makes this unlikely.

Each firm has an incentive to cheat by lowering its price

and capturing sales from competitors.

The prisoners’ dilemma creates price rigidity in oligopolistic markets. Firms are reluctant to change

prices for fear of setting off price warfare.

Price leadership is a form of implicit collusion that

sometimes gets around the prisoners’ dilemma. One

firm sets price and other firms follow suit.

In a cartel, producers explicitly collude in setting

prices and output levels. Successful cartelization

requires that the total demand not be very price elastic,

and that either the cartel control most supply or else

the supply of noncartel producers be inelastic.



QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What are the characteristics of a monopolistically competitive market? What happens to the equilibrium

price and quantity in such a market if one firm introduces a new, improved product?

2. Why is the firm’s demand curve flatter than the total

market demand curve in monopolistic competition?

15



Suppose a monopolistically competitive firm is making

a profit in the short run. What will happen to its

demand curve in the long run?

3. Some experts have argued that too many brands of

breakfast cereal are on the market. Give an argument

to support this view. Give an argument against it.



“Congress Weighs an Expanded Milk Cartel That Would Aid Farmers by Raising Prices,” New York

Times, May 2, 1999. For an update, go to the following Web site: www.dairycompact.org.



CHAPTER 12 • Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 483

4. Why is the Cournot equilibrium stable? (i.e., Why

don’t firms have any incentive to change their output

levels once in equilibrium?) Even if they can’t collude,

why don’t firms set their outputs at the joint profitmaximizing levels (i.e., the levels they would have

chosen had they colluded)?

5. In the Stackelberg model, the firm that sets output first

has an advantage. Explain why.

6. What do the Cournot and Bertrand models have in

common? What is different about the two models?

7. Explain the meaning of a Nash equilibrium when

firms are competing with respect to price. Why is the

equilibrium stable? Why don’t the firms raise prices to

the level that maximizes joint profits?



8. The kinked demand curve describes price rigidity. Explain how the model works. What are its

limitations? Why does price rigidity occur in oligopolistic markets?

9. Why does price leadership sometimes evolve in oligopolistic markets? Explain how the price leader

determines a profit-maximizing price.

10. Why has the OPEC oil cartel succeeded in raising

prices substantially while the CIPEC copper cartel

has not? What conditions are necessary for successful

cartelization? What organizational problems must a

cartel overcome?



EXERCISES

1. Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive

industry were merged into one large firm. Would that

new firm produce as many different brands? Would it

produce only a single brand? Explain.

2. Consider two firms facing the demand curve

P = 50 − 5Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. The firms’ cost functions are C1(Q1) = 20 + 10 Q1 and C2(Q2) = 10 + 12 Q2.

a. Suppose both firms have entered the industry. What

is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How

much will each firm produce? How would your

answer change if the firms have not yet entered the

industry?

b. What is each firm’s equilibrium output and profit

if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot

model. Draw the firms’ reaction curves and show

the equilibrium.

c. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay to purchase Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover

is not?

3. A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and

marginal) cost of AC = MC = $5. It faces a market

demand curve given by Q = 53 − P.

a. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity

for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits.

b. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let Q1 be

the output of the first firm and Q2 be the output of

the second. Market demand is now given by

Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P

Assuming that this second firm has the same costs

as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of Q1 and Q2.

c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm

chooses its profit-maximizing level of output on the

assumption that its competitor’s output is fixed. Find

each firm’s “reaction curve” (i.e., the rule that gives its

desired output in terms of its competitor’s output).



d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values

of Q1 and Q2 for which each firm is doing as well as

it can given its competitor’s output). What are the

resulting market price and profits of each firm?

*e. Suppose there are N firms in the industry, all with

the same constant marginal cost, MC = $5. Find the

Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm

produce, what will be the market price, and how

much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that

as N becomes large, the market price approaches

the price that would prevail under perfect

competition.

4. This exercise is a continuation of Exercise 3. We

return to two firms with the same constant average

and marginal cost, AC = MC = 5, facing the market

demand curve Q1 + Q 2 = 53 − P. Now we will use

the Stackelberg model to analyze what will happen

if one of the firms makes its output decision before

the other.

a. Suppose Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader (i.e., makes

its output decisions before Firm 2). Find the reaction curves that tell each firm how much to produce

in terms of the output of its competitor.

b. How much will each firm produce, and what will

its profit be?

5. Two firms compete in selling identical widgets. They

choose their output levels Q1 and Q2 simultaneously

and face the demand curve

P = 30 - Q

where Q = Q1 + Q2. Until recently, both firms had zero

marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have

increased Firm 2’s marginal cost to $15. Firm 1’s marginal cost remains constant at zero. True or false: As a

result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level.

6. Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and

that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs



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