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3 Decision Making in Conditions of Certainty, Risk and Uncertainty

3 Decision Making in Conditions of Certainty, Risk and Uncertainty

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Very large part of decisions may regard many goals, which from the point of
view of optimisation are desired, and sometimes necessary. Then decision maker is
forced to use or not heuristics of compensation. In compensation approach, the
options listed lower in terms of an attribute “are compensated by good results in
terms of other features (. . .). In case of non-compensative strategy such concession
would not be possible” (Goodwin and Wright 2011, p. 33, translated).
In the process of decision making, the decision maker has the individual ability
to perceive the reality, which is pointed out by the representatives of behavioural
economics, in particular psychological and experimental economics. To cognitive
predispositions related to perception of reality belong (Polowczyk 2012):
(a) framing (so-called context effect)—inappropriate context of realisation of a
problem, e.g. too wide or too narrow,
(b) anchoring fallacy—tendency to subconsciously adopt the output
suggestions, so-called anchor,
(c) availability fallacy—selective use of memory; using those informational
signals, which are encoded in memory; this fallacy may be caused on
purpose or unconsciously by very frequent repetition of the same communicate in mass media, which results in greater sensitivity of memory to
these and not other information,
(d) halo effect—seeing one positive feature (of person, phenomenon, thing)
causes tendency to positively evaluate its other attributes or features,
(e) self-perception theory—people recognise themselves on the basis of
observing own behaviours and retrospection. This way they form habits
necessary for new situations,
(f) illusion of truth—natural tendency to accept more understandable
statements as true, even though they can be false. On the other hand,
frequent repetition of false statements in understandable language leads to
considering them as true even by the recipient, who initially believed the
communicate to be false,
(g) superstitions—belief in superstitions, magical numbers, etc.,
(h) the curse of knowledge—limited thinking, not accepting that others can
have and use different knowledge,
(i) false consensus—convinced that others think as we do (while it is quite the
opposite).
On the other hand, decision makers of the public sphere of management, in
decision-making process often choose consultations and solutions (dispersing liability). Thus, are more inclined to act if the decision-making process has undergone
a commonly used practice of consultation—they consider deciding to be less risky
then. They then avoid making decisions based on both analytical practices (which
may come as a surprise, if those practices are not accompanied by speculations) and
controversial decisions, qualifying them as more risky (Nutt 2006). Such calculation is a rational action from the point of view if own interest, directed at
maintaining the managerial position and anti-developmental from the point of
view of the organisation or even society within organisation of state.

2.3

Decision Making in Conditions of Certainty, Risk and Uncertainty

Congruence level

Low

Low

Adherence to
the
profitability of
the business High

Ignorance of expectations

High

Rewarded expectations

FRAUDS

INNOVATIONS

hiding/secrecy

enthusiasm/sense of

Lack of foresight

35

Costly foresight

CRISIS

COMPETITION/
SURVIVAL

stress/anxiety

anger/frustration

Fig. 2.4 Model of ethical behaviour, decision-making and accompanyin emotions. Source:
A. Barraquier 2011, Ethical behaviour in practice: decision outcomes and strategic implications,
“British Journal of Management”, Vol. 22, Issue Supplement, March, p. S39

Making decisions, especially in relation to public sector, always or almost
always may require ethical reflection, on condition that the decision maker is
familiar with such values and thus he is convinced about necessity of moral
identification of content of a given decision. If this condition is fulfilled, then on
the basis of own knowledge, experience and personal beliefs the decision maker
intuitively makes a judgement and sets direction for specific decision making
process. He analyses various weights of relative conditions, evaluating between
ethics and common good and the profit and economic (Barraquier 2011) efficiency
of the functioning of the organization, sometimes being considered in the context of
subjective personal benefits. Where ethicality of behaviour in a given organisation
is usually identified with moral evaluation of actions of general management, its
leaders and employees (Cremer et al. 2011).
Worthy of attention in this context is the proposed by A. Barraquier foursegment model of strategic consequences resulting from making decisions in
conditions of uncertainty with various levels of congruence or adherence to profitability. It consists of four profiles: fraud, crisis, innovations and survival
(Barraquier 2011) (Fig. 2.4).
In the presented model of choice between ethics and gain, fraud does not seem to
be a decisive choice. If a given organisation is not able to assign required resources
to realise specified tasks, the managers in order to execute them work in higher
stress, which causes conflict situations, evokes a sense of helplessness and even
rebellion. It results from the fact, that the made decisions do not guarantee gain,
even though they could have. Situation is dramatically different, when managers
prove themselves creative and implement new projects (Barraquier 2011). Another
element of the model in public organisations can be the adoption of focused on
survival and inertial attitudes, where the main frustration can be uncertainty related

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to change of the general manager of the institution or state, which may naturally
seek personnel changes at different positions.

2.4

Heterogeneous Knowledge in Strategic Planning
and Decision Making

Implementing a strategic planning at all levels of state institutions is usually
threatened with bigger or smaller failures in some areas. The difficulties appear
not only in realising goals oriented at certain results, but also in adjusting the annual
activity plans to state’s strategic plans and long-term goals in the given scope.
Responsible for it are very often only managers of public organisations, who simply
do not work, but also frequently the reason is the lack of adequate resource, in
particular of financial character (Poister 2010). It means, that public organisations
and their managers should today start to look for new, more creative ways to draw
conclusions from occurring trends, make a realistic evaluation of own possibilities
of action and clearly determine, which situations and events may evade the counteraction or reacting possibilities (Poister 2010). An open question for individual
response remains how the future manager of public sector expresses acceptance to
endorse a given institution or government and how is faced with the necessity to
choose between the current position and inability to manage, and resigning from the
current function in the name of principles and individual ideals, which entails losing
the position and remuneration he is entitled to.
The decisions made must actually, instead of only declaratively, make public
values real, like e.g. responsibility, transparency, ability to act or quality. They need
to consider a fact, that public service should entail constant employment of external
counsellors to solve a given problem or realise a given project within planned actions
(Reynaers 2014). However, one should exceptionally carefully decide, which
services can be developed within public and private partnership or privatisation of
so far public activity (Bovaird 2004), taking into consideration not only the financial
result, but also common good and satisfaction of guaranteed needs.
Determining the developmental needs of an organisation the state is, requires
conducting strategic analyses, which will set grounds for decision making. In this
matter key meaning have time, dynamics of communication and information
exchange. From the point of view of decision makers it is important, whether
such dynamics lead to capturing the information from heterogeneous sources and
their effective aggregation (Acemoglu et al. 2014), and finally—use as economic
system knowledge in:
(a) regulative:
– system of legal norms,
– system of moral norms—religious and moral standards, which regulate
the actions of a given society,
– economic trading system (especially in terms of economic trading security, defined as “non-inertial system of mutual balance for free and

2.4

Heterogeneous Knowledge in Strategic Planning and Decision Making

37

regulated gainful activity, with the party autonomy, necessity to maintain existing risk volume by maintaining limited confidence in the
economic and legal relations between the contracting parties, the internal environment and the environment in which the entity operates”)
(Raczkowski 2014c),
– systemic actions supporting innovativeness and profiling of sciences
with high coefficient of financing from national budget or/and public
and private partnership.
(b) actual:
– interdependency of separate organisations and groups of states within a
global market,
– functioning of global trade,
– risk evaluation in decision making process (“with mitigating risks in
business, where the size net revenue from the sale of goods and services
in the profit and loss account will allow the development of such a net
profit in the fiscal year that will allow for smoother running a business in
the short and medium term”) (Raczkowski 2014b),
– tax evasion and fulfilment of obligations imposed by public levy,
– cooperation and coopetition,
– factors stabilising and supporting a specified legal paradigm in business,
– supporting foreign expansion of domestic entities in the context of
symmetric attracting the necessary and possible to tax foreign investment (Raczkowski 2014a).

On the one hand the degree of use of knowledge from managerial point of
view can depend to a large extent from the problem solving institution, which is a
derivative of both theoretical knowledge and practical experience (Dane and Pratt
2009). Decision maker in a natural way, resembling homo heuristicus, may
present partial thinking ignoring a part of available information. M. H. Bazerman
and D. Moore (2009) prove, that people declare proclaim the importance of
avoiding bias, while for their leaders choose those with a greater bias or particularly biased.
On the other hand, a partial mind can show higher efficiency and effectiveness in
relation to planning or decisive uncertainty basing on general processing and more
intensive resource strategy (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Akinci and SadlerSmith 2012; Kluver et al. 2014). Important in this process is undoubtedly systemic
thinking, which in public domain should regard such planning and designing the
work system of the institution, that will be focused on specific needs of citizens as if
they were clients, and integration of the decision-making processes could result
from the work itself (Jaaron and Backhouse 2011; Seddon 2005). Thus recognition
and analysis of knowledge on ways of making decision by a given person allows

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predicting how this person will behave in a given decision-making situation (Rowe
and Boulgarides 1994).

2.5

Planning and Decision Making in Political Transformation

Political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe initiated in 1989–1990 was
basically subordinated to the idea of a political project, which the Washington
Consensus was. These are the recommendations of World Bank, International
Monetary Fund and Treasury Department of the United States related to the reform
package recommended for poor countries. The Consensus strongly emphasised the
need of restricting the role of the state in the economy, privatisation of national
property and liberalisation of trade1 (Załe˛ski 2012) (Table 2.3).
The document for the first time was presented in 1989 in Washington by
J. Williamson,2 then director if Global Economy Institute (Leszczyn´ski 2010). In
the initial version it was meant for Latin America, but in a short time it was adopted
in other states, in particular of the Eastern Block. This way it became a main
indicator of conditions a state should fulfil to receive financial aid from International Monetary Fund. Rigid respect for its conditions led to situation, where states
under political transformation were kept in the state of fiscal discipline, which
resulted in decrease of economic growth. Such state naturally experienced bankruptcy of enterprises, and as the result massive lay-offs that increased unemployment, contributed to the social exclusion of citizens and caused further difficulties
to the state budget3 (Kołodko 2005).
The turn of 80s and 90s of the twentieth century in Central and Eastern Europe is
a period of political and systemic changes associated with offset (at least partially)
of the Communist Party from power and attempt to democratisation. The transformation initiated in Poland in 1989 quickly evolved—it covered in total 30 states and
territory populated now by about 1.8 billion of people (Kołodko 2010b). From this
perspective and after 25 years from historical changes, we need to think, whether it
is a sole success or maybe a partial success paid with structural decision-making
mistakes. Whereas it is about the use of critical management studies in consistent
and multidimensional analysis of organizational reality of the state. In the example
below Poland will be described as pioneer state in implementing reforms in
that time.
1
In literature of subject it is pointed out, that the Washington Consensus in many cases set very
low costs of entering the market for other Western entities, caused cheap sale of large part of
national property, blocked the possibility of capital accumulation, destroyed national production
(liquidation).
2
After years the author of Washington Consensus explained, that he was in majority wrongly
understood, and his intentions were different from actually conducted changes.
3
From today’s perspective the shock therapy of political transformation introduced in later period
in post-socialist countries is rather seen as a failure then success.

2.5

Planning and Decision Making in Political Transformation

39

Table 2.3 Washington Consensus recommendations
No.
1.
2.

Version I Directives
Maintaining fiscal discipline
New priorities in public expenditure

3.

Tax reforms for lowering national
tax rates and broadening of tax base
Trade liberalisation
Liberalisation of foreign direct
investment flow

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

Financial markets liberalisation
Privatisation of national enterprises
(accepting foreign investors)
Deregulation of markets for market
entry and promoting competition
Property rights protection (state
warranties for private property)
Exchange rates

Version II Directivesa
Increased savings
Reorientation of public expenditure (for specific
goals)
Tax system reform
Strengthening banking supervision
Maintaining exchange rate at a level ensuring
competitiveness, while avoiding fluctuations and
stiffness
Integral trade liberalisation
Building new market economy
Possibility of having clearly defined property
rights by all citizens
Creating independent institutions: central bank,
treasury apparatus, independent jurisdiction and
agency promoting development undertakings
Increase in investment in education

a

developed at the beginning of 1990s; does not contain conclusions from reformative and
stabilising actions in Central and Eastern Europe
Own, on the basis of: J. Williamson 1990, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, w: Latin
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, edited by J. Williamson, Washington Institute
for International Economics, Washington; D. Rodrik 2011, Jedna ekonomia, wiele recept.
Globalizacja, instytucje i wzrost gospodarczy, Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warszawa,
p. 34; J. Osiatyn´ski 2006, Finanse publiczne—ekonomia i polityka, Wydawnictwo Naukowe
PWN, Warszawa

Many authors state, that in Poland the most radical shock therapy was applied, as
so were the complex changes described, especially of economic character
(Giannaros 2008). But according to S. Gomułka (1994) the real shock therapy
was conducted only in German Democratic Republic (GDR). In Poland, like in
Lithuania, Estonia, former Czechoslovakia and Russia, mainly managed shock
strategy was used.
According to T. Kowalik the shock therapy for Poland, called Balcerowicz’s
plan or Big Bang, was unnecessary. It was “an expression of neophyte faith of key
decision-makers and their advisers in the free market, which facilitated the adoption
of a standard IMF prescription ignoring the different conditions of the economy
coming out of real socialism (. . .). What is more surprising, the experts who
suggested Poland the »leap« into the market have previously advocated views
more focused on the evolutionary transformation, which did not indicate the
coming radicalism. For the fate of »leap« crucial were opinions of
T. Mazowiecki, W. Kuczyn´ski and L. Balcerowicz—the trinity, which had a
deciding influence on the shape of what is called the Balcerowicz’s Plan.
J. Kuron´ played a great role in defending the plan” (Kowalik 2009, p. 80, translated). Dozens of foreign experts participating in formal and informal groups dealt

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with support for the reforms in Poland. The most significant were J. Sachs—
professor at Harvard University in Boston, G. Soros—millionaire who made a
fortune on currency speculation and D. Lipton—expert of the International Monetary Fund. How W. Kiez˙un (2012) notices, on the basis of the description presented
by J. Sachs himself (2006), the actual first plan of political transformation in Poland
was presented by J. Sachs during a meeting with B. Geremek, J. Kuron´ and
A. Michnik. They have accepted solutions different from those that were later
used in business practice. “So the government with Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the
Prime Minister and Leszek Balcerowicz was formed, which realised Jeffrey Sachs’
plan, initiated, suggested and financed by George Soros, later however called
Balcerowicz’s Plan. This plan in a concentrated form did not precise the most
important and disadvantageous issues, which were later implemented. It consisted
of seven basic elements, which included:
(a) “ownership transformation bringing the ownership structure closer to the
one in highly developed states,
(b) radical increase in independence of local government enterprises,
(c) full introduction of market mechanisms, in particular freedom of setting
prices, which meant the elimination of restrictions and mandatory
mediation,
(d) creation of conditions for internal competition by anti-trust policy and full
freedom to create new businesses,
(e) opening the economy to the world by introducing exchange of PLN (. . .),
(f) launching the capital market,
(g) creation of labour market” (Kowalik 2009)
On the basis of a generally formulated plan, the first planning document of the
beginning of transformation was created—economic programme of
T. Mazowiecki’s government (see: Program gospodarczy rza˛du Tadeusza
Mazowieckiego 1989; Stanisław Gomułka i transformacja polska. Dokumenty i
analizy 1968–1989 2010), consisting of seven basic elements as the sum of changes
in the state. In short, the programme assumed:
(a) The starting point—which stated that Polish economy required systemic
changes of a fundamental nature, since the economy was in a dramatic
situation and on the border of collapse of state finances. In order to shorten
the transitional period of building the market system, explicitly discussed
were rapid and radical measures, to meet Polish historical challenge, with a
government’s strong determination to act.
(b) Programme’s general assumptions—assuming two-fold realisation of the
programme: stabilisation of inflation (especially to control inflation) and
transformation of the economic system. Preparation of projects and their
implementation in organisational and legislative sphere would serve this
purpose. It was clearly indicated, that strong inflation would impede the
success of systemic changes and expected foreign aid.

2.5

Planning and Decision Making in Political Transformation

41

(c) Stabilisation of economy—through e.g. not allowing the inflation rate to
grow (anti-trust legislation, active commodity reserve policy, discontinuing
unprofitable and non-ecological production, modification of wage indexation rules—to compensatory indexation, making long-term savings more
attractive, inhibition of investment demand, the sale of certain items of state
property, more strict financial policy towards enterprises) and stopping the
outflow of PLN; limiting the number of government grants for state
enterprises and subsidised goods (means of production for agriculture,
food products, etc.). It was also assumed, that some of production plants
would be forced to declare bankruptcy, there would be a temporary drop in
production and rise in unemployment, which would have been balanced
with social protection system.
(d) Systemic changes—for the breakthrough change of economic system like
in Western, highly developed states. Ownership transformations carried out
according to the rules adopted by the parliament, increase of autonomy of
state enterprises, the implementation of full market mechanism and the
freedom of conducting business, opening of the economy to the outside, the
reform of state finances (including tax system), creation of labour market
and capital market; separation of communal property from the state property and transfer the management of that same property to the hands of local
government; cities and communes to allocate the right to conduct business
and creating communal associations and municipal bond issues were to
serve that goal. The abolition of restrictions on the size of individual farms
and land trade barriers with support for agriculture; allowed full disposal of
buildings and dwellings (including freedom of adjusting rents). The abolition of most extra-budgetary funds subsidized from state budget and the
establishment of stock exchanges for the capital market. Systemic actions
were to include the implementation of social program to new labour market
conditions.
(e) Social policy towards changes in economic system—introduction of protective measures for the most vulnerable economic groups in society in the
form of: vouchers for basic articles (protection of level of consumption),
rent allowances, proper indexation of pensions, social assistance system
reorganization—which results in higher efficiency and increased welfare
state functions span (state and extra-budgetary support); comprehensive
reform of the social security system according to the real value of benefits.
(f) Foreign support for stabilisation programme and systemic changes—close
collaboration with creditors, international organisations and the
governments of other states whose support is dependent on the conduct of
internal changes.
(g) Social and political conditions for reforms—would be realised only if they
were accepted and adopted by the majority of the population; therefore
required support of trade unions, both Houses of Parliament and government. The programme stated, that lack of common consent for realisation
would have meant a complete elimination of PLN, hyperinflation and

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disorganisation of social life, which further was to result in the introduction
of “a war-type economy with full rationing and supply rationing system”
(Stanisław Gomułka i transformacja polska. Dokumenty i analizy 1968–
1989 2010).
However, before the programme was announced on August 18, 1989, J. Sachs
and D. Lipton have presented the Senate Economic Commission with their
programme of reforms for Poland. The concept assumed, that e.g. ½–¾ of savings
from subsidies will be allocated to increase the wage fund and eliminate excessive
employee payroll tax on businesses (Kiez˙un 2012). It didn’t happen, though. Tax
from over-normative wage payments, called popiwek, burdened the employer with
200 % or 500 % tax, if the company has increased wage bill—respectively in the
ranges of prescribed limit of 0.1–3 %, and more than 3 %. Social protests made the
government withdraw from using this type of tax as a tool of declarative fight with
inflation in 1991 for private companies, and in 1992 for public sector. However, a
large number of enterprises was obliged to pay these burdens till the end of March
1994. It caused mass outflow of higher managerial staff and skilled employees to
private enterprises, which were situated more competitively than state enterprises.
Realization of transformation plan was more than a shock, it took place in a
spontaneous and revolutionary way. Sudden marketisation of economy and opening
of the internal market—without at least protective barriers in the form of temporal
prohibitive customs on a large group of goods—resulted in mass bankruptcy of
almost 40 % of state enterprises. They simply have not been a competition for
developing companies in the country, and especially for foreign companies. Many
enterprises were taken over for next to nothing and the resources from privatisation
announced in 1990 (see: Act of 13 July 1990 on commercialization and
privatization of state enterprises) were in a large part wasted. “Legislator’s goal
was to give the existing state owned enterprises the organisational and legal form
typical for commercial law entities, but only to sell shares in these commercialized
companies to private investors. We lacked the attempt at differentiated approach to
separate categories of entities, namely strictly commercial sector entities and
entities performing public tasks” (Grzegorczyk 2012). Six years later, that is in
1996, there was a possibility to carry out the spontaneous commercialization under
the Act of August 30, 1996 on commercialization and privatization of state
enterprises (Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996).
The Sachs-Soros stipulation on reprivatisation of Polish citizens’ property
(including enterprises) has never been carried out. Finally, the gigantic hyperinflation has been stopped, but hasn’t the price of those reforms been too high?
W. Kiez˙un clearly states, that “the authors of preliminary actions lacked elementary, basic knowledge in management and organisation. Thanks to it Poland has
become a kind of El Dorado for foreign capital” (2012, p. 132, translated).
Although the International Monetary Fund has imposed rigorous regulations
under which Poland should have received help, even then director of experts of
International Monetary Fund M. Bruno expressed surprise that Poland had chosen
the most strict level of support. For society it meant dramatically shocking reforms.

2.5

Planning and Decision Making in Political Transformation

43

In December 1989 Polish reformers themselves made the programme even more
rigorous by decreasing the coefficient of planned inflation in 1990 from 140 % to
95 %. As we know it was more than six times higher. Also the payment indexation
rate was decreased from 0.8 to 0.3 in January 1990 and 0.02 in consequent months,
which resulted in decline in the standard of living of payment recipients (Kowalik
2009; Kuczyn´ski 1992).
From today’s perspective we may ask, whether the evident economic successes
after 25 years of transformation in its initial years have been a consciously and
unconsciously approved robbery of public property with simultaneously pushing
the state by multinational corporations to the role of incapacitated entity? Was it a
kind of creative destruction deprived of rationality of actions of old/new managers?
Phases of development of economy in political transformation period can be
described in four stages—each of them ended with bankruptcy of many enterprises:
short-term survival techniques (failure), functional restructuring (failure), process
restructuring (failure), improvement (failure) (Koz´min´ski 2014).
No surprise then, that many critical opinions occurred of not the very transformation, which was necessary, but the methods, techniques and tools used to execute
it. It needs to be underlined, that the criticism appeared in the initial stage of
introducing reforms and was articulated i.e. by Nobel Prize laureates —M.
Firedman or G. S. Becker (Kiez˙un 2012). One of the greatest Polish authorities in
the field of management studies A. K. Koz´min´ski has also criticised from the very
beginning the implemented reforms, and several years later, in 1997, he explained
that “still then inexperienced experimentalist L. Balcerowicz has indeed achieved
an impressive market balance, but he has ignored the outcomes of his actions for
state economy and led to the bankruptcy of many state enterprises, which another
fanatic J. Lewandowski gave to foreign capital for next to nothing. The same
government was culpable of losing Eastern markets and too early liquidation of
State Farms, which led to almost three-million unemployment and abandonment of
thousands of hectares of cultivation in arable land. This practice carried out with
reprehensible recklessness, without taking into account the social consequences,
received euphemistic title of shock therapy, or another, better reflecting the results
of this project: “reform by ruin”. When in result of these operations and other
negligences the state fund begin to lack money, the Solidarity-based government
reduced valorisation of payments in budget sphere and—against the law—
valorisation of pensions, unscrupulously shifting the burden of economic
restructuring on the poorest. The state was led to bankruptcy and to this day is
not able to get out of it” (Kiez˙un 2012, p. 192, translated). In 2006 L. Balcerowicz
published in “Daily Star: the article Losing Milton Friedman. A Revolutionary
Muse of Liberty, where he wrote: “I live in Poland that is now free, and I consider
Milton Friedman to be one of the main intellectual architects of my country’s
liberty” (Klein 2008). It is a fact, Poland is free, but do the accepted architect
Friedman’s ideological plans have not led to a construction disaster, on whose ruins
the new order was built? Many great experts and economists share this opinion.
G. Kołodko believes, that “the younger ones still carry the burden of naive and
harmful ide´e fixe in the form of shock therapy. Unsuccessful attempts to carry it out

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entailed the enormity of the costs that could have been avoided, by bringing the way
a lot less of the therapeutic effects than it was possible to achieve, when choosing a
different path of changes. And if now some would like to forget about rubbish like
»shock therapy« (or preferably convince themselves and others that supposedly it
was successful), then getting to the heart of the matter is necessary (. . .). Not only
from the point of view of historical truth—how often lied about in relation to the
periods, which have just passed—and correctness of ex post economic interpretation. It has also ex ante significance, since in historical process of development in
various part of the world on its various levels many mistakes can still be avoided”
(Kołodko 2010a). Analysis, or rather a very concise synthesis of the course of
transformation in Poland, is or should be at the same time a lesson to those, who are
or will be engaged in the public governance and management processes. Necessary
in this process is understanding of history, where the given economic activity has
developed, since it is a kind of manager’s toolbox to help understand why modern
conditions are such, and not different. The history brings ideas, is the example of
good or bad practices, which can increase or decrease effectiveness of action of
given organisation (de Geus 1997; Griffin 2004).
Bank of Sweden’s Alfred Nobel Prize laureate in economics E. S. Phelps bluntly
comments the weakening of the state and the introduction of a free market
institutions at all costs: “Intellectual wave, which is luckily extinguishing, insisted
on the government to be neutral towards economy. Boys from Chicago school saw
the perfect government as basically esoteric thing—like Pope or Dalai Lama. They
accepted giving out money, did not accept interference in the market. (. . .). I
believe in economic freedom. I believe in free entrepreneurship. I believe in
creativity, inventiveness, ingenuity. I do not believe in free market and esoteric
state. These are the myths destroying the economic studies, and then the economy,
society and the state” (Phelps 2008).
Political transformation in Polish conditions certainly contributed in long term to
economic growth, which for many years was significantly faster than growth of
salary, to integration with global economy and increase of efficiency (Marra and
Carlei 2014). However, it incurred a high social cost. Privatisation often could have
served to favour and create specific business groups, which in one form or another
could finance a particular political party (Szanyi 2013). Lack of transparency of
many processes and mechanisms of action of political class and unusually expansive at that time “cunning” entrepreneurship finally had influence on the significant
decrease of effectiveness of privatisation (Marra and Carlei 2014) and degree of
realisation of assumed goals. At the same time we need to remember, that the
employees of public sector fundamentally differ in acceptance of risk, since to
various degrees they are vulnerable to shocks arising in the economy (Kallianiotis
2013).
Official beginning of questioning the legitimacy of rigid recommendations of
Washington Consensus occurred only at the beginning of twenty-first century
following the disclosure of the global financial crisis. In 2008 International Monetary Fund recommended that states adopted the stimulus packages for economy and
helped make mild fiscal cuts—depending on the state of the economy.